

CHINA AND THE NATIONS

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*Being the Draft of the Report on International Problems
prepared for the International Problems Committee
of the People's Conference of Delegates
at Peking in April, 1925*

BY

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RENDERED IN ENGLISH, AND EDITED WITH AN INTRODUCTION
EXPLANATORY FOOTNOTES AND A MAP

BY

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INTRODUCTION

i. England and China.

‘China and The Nations’ was composed by Mr. Wong Ching-wai as the official statement of China’s international history in modern times and of her future policy, on the occasion of the People’s Conference at Peking in April, 1925. It expresses the permanent opinion of China’s National Party, and of the mass of Chinese.

During the autumn of 1926 two truths have at last been forced upon the British people. First, the Chinese National Party, called the Kuo Min Tang, is the destined leader of half at least, probably of all, the Chinese people. Second, every advance of that party is followed immediately by a further demand for the restoration to China of sovereign rights at present denied her. These demands may seem, from outside, progressive manifestations of swiftly developing national confidence and self-assertion, rather than the coherent parts of a logical scheme, which in fact they are. The book here presented to the British public for the first time has, ever since its presentation to the People’s Conference, been accepted by China as the foundation of this scheme. By means of it the British reader can understand

the present developments of Chinese foreign policy as they occur, and clearly foresee its future.

China possesses one third of the world's population. Her power, in genius, labour and natural resources, must affect human history decisively. The Chinese people, after three thousand years of a culture and an art of life more highly elaborated than any others known to men, has been forced to wake out of long indifference into the modern world of Western materialistic progress, and finds itself bound with the fetters of Lilliput. Those fetters it is now snapping. What will follow? The answer lies with the Western powers, especially with England.

For reasons both political and historical, many of which will make themselves sufficiently plain to the intelligent reader of Mr. Wong's treatise, Anglo-Chinese friendship would be the surest guarantee of the world's peace, while Anglo-Chinese hostility must eventually involve East and West in a cataclysm compared with which the last great war was an earth tremor. Nor will the choice await our leisure. Soon the civil wars of the Chinese militarists, which have appeared to cripple, will be seen to have solidified the nation. The ivygrowth of diplomatic intrigue, which so long has strangled China from the outports and the foreign legations in Peking, will be rent off, together with the opium parasite, by a people determined upon self-realisation. By helping, instead of persistently hindering, the Chinese patriots, we can yet save their country from much avoidable unhappiness. We can, even now, identify British

friendship with the better China. Above all, we can do justice.

2. *The Chinese Republic, Sun Yat-sen and Yuan Shih-kai.*

I must here give the reader a brief account of Chinese Republican history, with particular reference to its two leading characters, Doctor Sun Yat-sen and Yuan Shih-kai.

In 1911 the Manchu Dynasty, which had ruled since 1644, was overthrown by the People's Revolution. The main causes of this were : First, the ruinous incompetence, corruption and cruelty of the degenerate Manchu rulers and their family favourites ; and second, the growth among the Chinese of a modern political spirit, largely enforced from the West, and preached all over China, and among the Chinese abroad, by Dr. Sun Yat-sen and his adherents.

On January 1, 1912, the Republic was inaugurated, with Dr. Sun as Provisional President.

The chief aims of the Republicans were the development of constitutional democracy and economic amelioration within China : and political equality with the foreign powers ; the latter involving on the one hand the release of China from foreign diplomatic, military and financial control, and on the other hand the free opening of the country to the foreigner, the abandonment of the hermit policy of the Manchus.

But the bright promise was not realised. Unfortunately, both for China and for humanity, the

Declaration of the Republic had been made possible only through the desertion of the Manchus by their most firmly trusted and most capable general, Yuan Shih-kai, whose army, trained for the Empress, remained the controlling factor in the situation. Under the shadow of Yuan, the republic was born.

It is, and always will be, a matter of controversy, at what stage in his life Yuan conceived the plan of replacing the Manchu sovereignty by his own. However, scarcely was the Republic in being, when, by successive diplomacy, terrorisation and fair professions, he prevailed on the Republicans to permit his presidency, in place of Sun. Sun, not deceived, but powerless to stand alone, consented. Yuan, after a solemn oath to preserve the Republican constitution, entered on the career of an avowed despot. Before long, he had himself elected 'permanent president,' the people's deputies voting at the sword-point. At his death, in 1916, he had actually been declared emperor.

To succeed, Yuan needed the money and favour of the foreign powers. The financial interests of the powers, whose commercial control and hopes of dominating China seemed threatened by the new Republican patriotism, needed Yuan. The bargain was concluded. There followed the payment of the 'Reorganisation Loan,' accepted by Yuan against the protest of the people's representatives, and in open violation of the constitution. By its means, he assassinated his political opponents, abolished constitutional government, and reduced the people

to submission with a barbarity unsurpassed within human knowledge. Finally, incompetent to govern, he surrendered the country to internal disruption and foreign domination. After his death China fell into a feudal anarchy. But such a feudal anarchy was never before seen. For the rival 'tuchuns' were financed by competing foreign interests, and for thirteen years have squandered over 80 per cent. of their country's revenues in civil wars in which they have been the tools, both singly and collectively, of foreign intrigue.

3. *The Kuo Min Tang.*

The surviving Republicans, re-organised and led by Dr. Sun, recommenced the work of the Revolution, and at last, in 1917, successfully installed at Canton the People's Government.

The Republican Party of Dr. Sun is called the Kuo Min Tang (the People's National Party). In 1905, Sun had formed the famous Chinese Union Society, by the amalgamation of the three main revolutionary groups.¹ The success of the Chinese Union Society (Tungmenghui) in achieving the Revolution, the adherence to it of the majority of educated Chinese, and its undoubted acceptance by the people as a whole, justified its change of title to Kuo Min Tang.

Ever since 1914, when it entered upon the second

¹ These original parties were :

- (i) The Hsin Chuen Hwei, the oldest, under Dr. Sun.
- (ii) The Kuan Fu Hwei, mainly consisting of scholars.
- (iii) The Hwa Hsin Hwei, formed by Chinese students in Japan.

fight for the Republican Constitution, the Kuo Min Tang has pursued three main objects.

First, it aims at educating the people at large in the political doctrines whose formulation and teaching were probably the most permanent achievement of Dr. Sun. Concerning these doctrines, a word is necessary. I cannot do better than quote Mr. Hang Lih-wu, librarian and associate of the Fuh Tan University of Shanghai :

‘ Let me give,’ he writes, ‘ a brief summary of Dr. Sun’s “ Three Peoples Doctrine,” in order to reveal the aims of the Kuo Min Tang.

‘ The “ Three Peoples Doctrine,” which Dr. Sun elaborates, is a faith and a movement. It aims at bringing about a national equality outside the state (“ of the people ”), a political equality in the state (“ by the people ”), and an economic equality corresponding to Lincoln’s “ for the people.”

‘ National equality Dr. Sun desired for the development not of imperialism out of nationalism, but of a nationalism leading to internationalism. He held that, if peace should be the object of mankind, China must cease to be, as at present she is, one of the stakes of international diplomacy, and must first be freed from her unequal treaties.¹

‘ By political equality, Dr. Sun meant a comprehensive system, the carrying out of which requires a

¹ This argument is developed in Dr. Sun’s book, written in English and published by Putnam, *The International Development of China*.

Briefly, if China is to remain a morsel in the international dog-fight, she is a morsel so juicy that the competing dogs, in tearing her, will inevitably tear each other to death.

constitutional separation of five powers, the executive, the legislative, the judicial, the inquisitive, and the examinational. To the people are granted four rights ; electoral, recall, referendum, and initiation.

‘ With regard to economic equality, Dr. Sun advocated two main principles, control of capital and nationalisation of the surplus value of land.’

This third principle of the Kuo Min Tang policy must not be confused with Socialism, or any ‘ ism ’ known to the West. Discounting for human mentality, at the present stage, its aim is to encourage private enterprise in all ways, exercising, in return, a final control in cases where unrestrained individualism is against the public interest. This co-operation between government and owning class, for mutual advantage, is expected to become closer with time : merging at last into a polity where between individualism and public service no distinction is felt to exist.

Such a doctrine is as old as philosophy. But in China it is a practical restatement, to meet modern needs, of the principles operative in the best days of the old native Ming Dynasty. Therefore, it is not surprising that Dr. Sun’s programme won everywhere the favour of the people : so that in the elected Parliament of 1913, the first and last freely elected Parliament of the Republic until to-day, the overwhelming majority of members belonged to the Southern Kuo Min Tang party. To-day, the result would be far more decisive. Through the agency of the Chinese militarists, the issue has been deferred.

But China is fast gaining coherence. Modern military technique is no longer the monopoly of the reactionaries.

So much for the first, or educative, object of the Kuo Min Tang, already achieved.

The second object was to set up in the South, where political ideas have been furthest developed, a government representative of the Republican Constitution, as a moral and material stronghold of Chinese nationalism.

After many attempts, this was achieved when, in 1917, Dr. Sun gained control of Canton, with the provinces of Kwangtung and Kwangsi. The stormy struggle of the People's Government in Canton against foreign intrigue and force, and internal reaction, is partly described in Chapter IV. of Mr. Wong's treatise. Since April, 1925, however, two brilliant campaigns by General Chang Kai-shek, the pupil of Dr. Sun, resulted in complete and final victory for the Republicans, who, at the time of writing, are newly established in Hankow.

The People's Government is admitted, even by its opponents, to be the best Chinese Government since the foundation of the Republic, and the only one successfully organised on a constitutional basis. It is the work of the best brains in China. Indeed, the Chinese Renaissance in modern times has throughout been intimately associated with the Republican movement.

Of the People's Government, Mr. Wong Ching-wai was elected leader, after Dr. Sun's death in 1925.

Thirdly, Military Ascendancy is essential.

Both in North and South, People's Citizen Armies have been built up, to rally the workers and students of China. The discipline of these armies is very strict, unlike other Chinese armies. Their spirit is patriotic, not mercenary. They are largely composed of students. Their material equipment was, until recently, not equal to that of the warlords. But they had in them the *morale* of the old Republicans, in whose ranks women fought and died with the men. The Northern People's Army, the Kuo-minchun, defeated in May of this year, and driven into Mongolia by Wu Pei-pu and Chang Tso-lin, has now returned to the attack in the North, following the sweeping victories of the Kuo Min Tang, under Chang Kai-shek. By the capture of Hankow, Hanyang (China's largest arsenal), and Wuchang (the capital of Hupeh, China's richest province), the complete victory of the Republicans,—always inevitable—has become, in all human probability, a matter of months. As I write, the National Government is supreme in the Yangtse Valley, and its armies are approaching Shanghai. Everywhere their appearance is the signal for a popular uprising.

4. *Sun Yat-sen and Wong Ching-wai.*

After his death, Dr. Sun Yat-sen became the hero of modern China. It has of late become the fashion among Western writers, either through ignorance or in the interest of propaganda, to belittle him. But

the Chinese best know their own.¹ To the small group of national heroes, chosen from four thousand years of history, Sun Yat-sen, father of the new China, was, within a month of his death, added for ever.

Dr. Sun speaks in this book through Wong Ching-wai. As such, Wong's treatise is accepted throughout China. As such, it sets forth the claims on which China will stand, and the reasons why she will stand on them.

Mr. Wong was a young man when he joined the Hwa Hsin Wei, a revolutionary Chinese group formed in Japan. For some years he studied in Paris. After 1905, when the parties were amalgamated in the Chinese Union Society, he was prominent as co-editor of the party organ, the *Ming Pao*. He wrote several important and popular books on politics, *The Race in the Nation* exercising deep influence. In 1910, accused of attempting to assassinate the Prince Regent, he was committed to life imprisonment, from which the Revolution released him in 1911.

From 1911 he was the special intimate of Dr. Sun, acting as his secretary. He experienced periods of office in 1911, and in 1918, when he was Finance Minister to the Southern Government.

In 1925 he was at his master's death-bed, as his chosen successor, and wrote at his dictation the two

¹ Interesting is the verdict of the late Sir James Cantlie, a man of unusually shrewd insight, and of the widest acquaintance. 'I have never known anyone like Sun Yat-sen; if I were asked to name the most perfect character I ever knew, I would unhesitatingly say Sun Yat-sen.'

famous wills, which form the programme of the New China. He was then chosen as leader by the Kuo Min Tang. He is destined, given health and strength, to be the President of the Chinese Republic.

In February of this year I had the honour and pleasure of long conversations with Mr. Wong.

Tall, cultured, quick in humour, and exceptionally endowed, even for a Chinese, with intuition of men, he impressed me most of all by his honesty and determination, and the great reserve of mental power in his personality. He is an idealist, celebrated for the austerity of his life, and for the energy of spirit which constantly outwears his health, and has temporarily broken it. An enthusiastic educationist, he found time, even while chairman of the Governing Committee, to play the part of a minister of education, and even to do some teaching in elementary schools. He is a famous orator.

In the words of my friend, Mr. Hang Lih-wu, who knows him well, ‘Although he has a full grasp of old philosophy and literature, he writes exclusively on political subjects. He is alert and silent, wholly of a scholarly type. But he is clearly one of the most practical and tactful members of his party. So, with his happy combination of theory and practice, there are few who doubt his capability of succeeding Dr. Sun.’

5. *Some Objections Answered.*

The first difficulty for an Englishman, in reading the following treatise, will be the recurring question,

'Can this be true?' The question I welcome. Would it were asked, again and again, about everything written concerning China.

I make two answers; first, that the treatise is framed on the text of recognised official documents; second, that the doubter is referred to the authoritative works on China enumerated in the bibliography, and to those mentioned in the footnotes.

Again, the reader may be uneasy at the thought of financial losses to this country involved in accepting the conclusions of Chapter V., and at a feeling of distrust as to how China will make use of her autonomy in her relations with foreigners.

Such considerations do not affect the justice of China's case. The argument from expediency I answer with a question: 'Could the situation be worse for foreign commerce than it is now, in the face of Chinese opposition and obstruction?'

Certain it is that the Chinese are destined shortly to achieve autonomy as an integral people. Shall we force that nation, with its limitless resources in men, brains and material, finally from its desired path of peace, compelling it to win by force what we are bound to give, if not in friendship at any rate in morals? The issue will not tarry on our leisure.

Finally, Bolshevism has been widely blamed as the cause of Chinese unrest, and even of Chinese nationalism. Did Bolshevism cause the National Movement of the Nineties? Or the Boxer Rising

of 1900? Or the Republic's demand for an integral China? Who can show one demand made by China to-day which had not been made repeatedly by the patriots before the dethronement of the Tsar?

6. *China, England and World Peace.*

Last, I come to the fear of what is insultingly called the Yellow Peril.

So far as concerns China, the only danger lies in the policy of interference and competitive penetration pursued by our own and other governments, which has forced the Chinese to become a nation in arms. The Chinese are notably pacifist, too deeply interested in their own beautiful and rich country—whose resources are almost intact, and very much of which remains unpopulated and virgin soil—to need or desire militant expansion.

In what is openly a militant manifesto, I call the reader's attention to the passage of Mr. Wong's statement, covering pages 127 and 128, especially to the words :

' If the Powers can of themselves cease from Imperialism, they are our intimate and respected friends, with whom we must co-operate on equal terms. How can we be anti-foreign? . . . At present, although the nations are imperialistic, the people are not therefore all imperialists. . . . The people of all the nations look to the Chinese people to co-operate with them in crushing imperialism. Once this is accomplished, not the Chinese people

alone will benefit, but the peoples of all the world.'

These words are the final declaration of the Chinese Nationalist Party. They express the spirit of China, the appeal of that great people to humanity, in humanity's cause. Mr. Wong's treatise, true to his people and to his master, Dr. Sun Yat-sen, is so much more than a declaration of state policy. It is a record inscribed with agony, addressed to the moral consciousness of mankind.

JOHN NIND SMITH.

TRANSLATION OF
THE WILL OF THE
PRESIDENT OF THE KUOMINTANG

DURING forty years I have devoted myself to the People's Revolution, whose aim is to win for China freedom and equality. From the gathered experience of forty years I profoundly realise that we can approach our object only by wakening the masses of the people and uniting with men who treat us as equals and fellow workers in the universal cause.

The victory of the Revolution is not yet achieved. All members of our party must labour in accordance with my books : *The Reconstruction of China*, *The Principles of Reconstruction*, *The Three Peoples Doctrine*, and the *Manifesto Issued to The First National Conference of Representatives*. We must labour unremitting until the victory is attained.

Especially my reasoned designs for the calling of a Peoples' Conference, and for the Abolition of the Unequal Treaties, should be fulfilled within a very short time.

Thus I willed.¹

¹ (Given by Doctor Sun Yat-sen in Peking, three days before the end of his last illness, which came on March the Twelfth, 1925)

PREFATORY LETTER TO THE PRELIMINARY CONFERENCE, PREPARATORY FOR THE PEOPLE'S CONFERENCE OF DELEGATES FROM THE PROVINCES.

(INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS COMMITTEE).

April 17th, 1925.

At the beginning of March, I was appointed as advisor by the Committee on International Problems.

Thereafter I was elected, by this Committee, to draft the resolutions.

At that time, Dr. Sun was fatally ill; and I had no time to perform the labour of drafting.

On March 12th, Dr. Sun left the world. Therefore the arrangement of his funeral ceremonials was my duty.

I myself was dangerously ill until the twentieth of that month, regaining my health with difficulty by April 10th.

I am regretfully conscious of my shortcomings in this work of drafting.

According to the Will of Dr. Sun, the Reasoned Proposal for holding the People's Conference, and for abolishing the Unequal Treaties, should be realised within a short time.

With both of these developments, Gentlemen, you are now dealing simultaneously.

Though I am ill at this moment, I must help as best I can.

I have herewith drafted the Resolutions for the International Problems Committee, adding thereto explanations and reasons ; and I submit the work for your approval.

The time has been too short. My knowledge is less than I would wish. I am still a sick man. Hence there must be not a few errors and omissions. I pray your indulgence.

Humbly, therefore, and with the sense of my shortcomings, I submit this Report.

Yours with sincere respect,

WONG CHING-WAI.

I

THE DEFINITION OF IMPERIALISM

What is Imperialism ?

Many people do not exactly know.

In its literal sense, the word might be interpreted as signifying monarchical government. But such is not its true meaning.

The French form of government is Republican. Is her treatment of Annam¹ other than imperialistic ? In this case, therefore, the word imperialism does not indicate a form of national government, but the colonial policy and methods pursued by the French.

Imperialism, in fact, is a term used to indicate a type of policy, and the methods resulting therefrom ; not a form of national constitution.

What is a Colony ?

Every nation, or area, or race, which is dominated by foreigners who use at pleasure the methods of imperialism, is called a colony.

In French Indo-China, places like Saigon are called colonies, because the people are French subjects ; while Tongching and Holai are called French

¹ French Indo-China.

Protectorates, having the King of Annam to rule them.

All are colonies.

Whether a country is called protectorate or colony, matters nothing ; in practice, a country dominated by Imperialists we call a colony.

Why do the Imperialists desire Colonies ?

It would take long to explain.

But, to speak in the light of the clearest and latest facts, the cause proceeded from the capitalistic system of the industrially advanced nations in the nineteenth century.

The European nations, especially England, expanded their powers of production very quickly, owing to the development of the factory system and of mechanical inventions.

Because of this excessive expansion of productive power, the manufactures and produce of the machines and factories, need markets abroad ; they cannot be consumed within the country.

Further, raw materials are required for manufactures, more than the country can supply. So the capitalist must seek for raw material abroad.

Now, the first object, in seeking a colony, is to find a market for the manufactured goods.

The second object is to secure a supply of raw materials.

The Methods of Imperialism.

If the people colonised will not accede to all the

demands of the capitalists, what will the Imperialists do ?

Even if the people colonised are, at first, so foolish as to yield to the capitalists, they will one day see their folly. Then they will fight against the capitalists. What will the Imperialists do ?

Imperialists have always been ready for these situations.

The first method, and the most important, which they employ, is to maintain, in their colonial politics, their superior power, and so to use it as to force the colonised peoples openly to realise their bondage ; by this means chaining them so fast that they can never win emancipation.

Sometimes the Imperialists arbitrarily adopt territories as their ‘spheres of influence’ ; sometimes they simply annex the countries of others, as colonies. Sometimes they will seek to devise fascinating terms —‘Protected Country,’ ‘Protected Area,’ and the like.

Sometimes they change their methods in a delightful fashion, as by contracting unequal treaties, according to which the privileges and rights fall to them, and the obligations to the other party. They then attend to their so-called Treaty Rights, in order to keep the countries thus obligated in perpetual subjection.

For the monopolisation of certain areas, they use such phrases as ‘Maintenance of Rights,’ ‘Maintenance of Superior Position and Prestige.’

When it is time to allocate the booty among

several Imperialistic Powers, they talk of 'Most-Favoured Nation Clauses,' or 'Equal Opportunity of Privileges.'

Such terms are very fascinating. But their one object is the promotion of political ascendancy.

Superior Political Power and Economic Invasion.

Sometimes the Imperialists promote their political ascendancy by using methods of political blackmail and duplicity.

Sometimes political blackmail and duplicity are insufficient : and then they resort to arms. They use machine guns, gas and aeroplanes—the typical products of their civilization—and are irresistible. Such military action is employed to promote their political ascendancy, which means occupying the market and monopolising the raw materials.

Economic invasion is the object ; and the promotion of political ascendancy is designed to protect the economic invasion.

Military power is both pioneer and reserve force in the struggle for political ascendancy.

Deadliness of Imperialism.

We thus perceive that Imperialism is very different in nature from the war-lust of historical tyrants, whose tyranny and pugnacity were always inspired by the ambition to extend their power and influence over other nations, and, this achieved, were satisfied. Whereas modern Imperialism has for its object economic invasion.

The militarism of the old tyrants culminated in conquering foreign territory : modern Imperialism in cutting down the livelihood of the people.

A country subdued by foreign arms is politically ruined. But the people remains ; and, with the people, the hope of national restoration.

When the people's livelihood is cut off, the result is race extinction. It is the end of the country, the end of the people.

Can China Survive ?

Men say, ' There never can be an end of China. China has been established strong in this belief for more than four thousand years, during which the Mongols once ruled her for more than ninety years, and the Manchus afterwards for more than two hundred and sixty. Despite eclipses, which had their periods, China remains.

' The Chinese people, therefore, needs not to fear extinction. Nor could foreigners extinguish it, even in dream.'

Ah. A fine argument. But let us consider.

The rule of the Mongols and of the Manchus resulted from China's failure in arms and politics, but not in economics. Therefore, though the nation was eclipsed, the people endured. The people could labour for the redemption of their power in war and in politics. Their chance came.

But to-day China faces the Imperialists, for whom military and political power are but a means ; their aim, economic penetration.

Unless China can resist this economic penetration, she will suffer economic defeat. Economic defeat means failure of the people's means of livelihood. Then how shall the people exist ?

Therefore, unless China can resist economic penetration, she will suffer, not subjection, but race extinction. Our people must take warning.

Imperialism Defined.

I conclude, from this argument, that Imperialism may be defined as

‘The utilization by any people of its political and military ascendancy, for subjecting to its economic encroachment some foreign country or territory or race.’

II

THE INFLUENCE OF IMPERIALISM ON WORLD POLITICS

The nature of Imperialism is unmistakeable.

What of its effects ?

These are difficult wholly to describe. But, broadly speaking, its main effects, up to the present, have been to extinguish or enslave three and a half of the five great races of mankind, and to change the colour of three and a half of the five continents.

America, Africa, Australia ; are they not become European colonies ?

Australia has already been called ‘ White Australia ’ ; coloured people being, according to this term, excluded from entry.

America now prohibits the coloured races from immigration.

Central and Western Asia are become European colonies, in the same way as Africa.

Yes ; three and a half great continents have changed colour.

Is this false or true ?

The Red People in America, the Negroes in Africa, and the Brown Race in Australia, as well as the

Yellow Race in Central and Western Asia, all are dominated by the European.

After all, the subjects have not long to endure their doom. Their death-rate is increasing, their birth-rate declining. Cruelty and death have ever been their lot at the hands of the European ; but the mortal brutality of gun and bayonet was merciful beside the cruel death imposed by economic penetration, whose continuous pressure at last renders life, even a precarious life, impossible for the subject peoples.

Three and a half out of five great races have been extinguished or enslaved.

Is this false or true ?

All peoples who desire emancipation from servitude, and deliverance from death, must fight against Imperialism. There is no choice.

Said General Ur Lur Dun Bau,¹ ‘ By every road the soldiers of the Emperor can march to life ; only the road to battle can lead them to death. By every road the revolutionaries march to death ; one only road of life is theirs, the road to battle.’ Even so, even now, for the slaves of Imperialism death ends all roads. Yet is there one road of life, the road to battle against Imperialism.

¹ General Ur Lur Dun Bau was a Manchurian general, of the time of the Taiping Rebellion. The Taipings are the revolutionaries referred to.

The Taiping Rebellion against the Manchus, which endured for ten years (1851-1861) was the greatest popular uprising in history. It is believed to have destroyed, during that time, one hundred million persons. Its intent was not political, so much as religious : but behind it can easily be discovered the popular hatred of the Manchu Dynasty, and the inefficiency and decadence of the central government.

Hung Siu-suen, born near Canton in 1813, was converted to

Christianity. He founded a Christian cult of his own, the Shang-ti-Hwei, believing himself inspired, and taking, among other titles, that of Heavenly King of the Great Peace (Tai Ping), the most popular inscription on the insurgents' banners. The cult was iconoclastic, and, for the first time in Chinese history, the queue, the symbol of worship of the Manchu Emperors, was cut off.

Nanking, captured in 1853, was made the capital of the rebels, who then declared Hung emperor. With his army of eighty thousand men steadily increasing, and served by the heroic and able General Chung, he seemed likely to become so.

The movement was at first greeted enthusiastically by many foreigners, and many missionaries saw, in its purity of moral teaching, a great hope for China.

But, with success, it gathered around it many of the worst adventurers and brigands in China. Hung himself—a man of strangely contrasting qualities—was ruined by the dynastic ambitions into which he allowed his followers to uplift him.

The Manchu Emperors were saved by General Tsêng Kuo-fan; but the war went on for many years, owing to the hopeless corruption of the Manchu administration.

Though in origin inspired by religious ideals, the whole movement became an expression of the widespread hatred of the Manchus, which was deservedly to overthrow them a hundred and fifty years later.

III

THE INFLUENCE OF IMPERIALISM IN CHINA

Introductory : General Survey.

Imperialism has already changed the colour of three and a half out of the five great continents, and has extinguished or enslaved the members of three and a half of the five great races of men.

Will the Imperialists, do you think, leave aside East Asia and her people, the fattest plunder of all ?

And, in shame I say it, Japan alone can resist them ; and she has been conquered spiritually by them. She joined their band, and succeeded in transforming the Tato Race.¹

China, meanwhile, has been driven along the common road that leads to extinction or enslavement.

I shall now describe the influence of Imperialism in China. To record in detail the history of Imperialistic encroachment, is outside the scope of this work. I shall limit myself to its tendencies and methods of development.

Can any systematic development be traced ?
If so, what is it ?

¹ The ancient name of the Japanese race.

I shall devote this chapter to answering these questions.

Imperialistic encroachment in China, from its beginning until the present time, may be treated in five periods :

I. The first period runs from the Opium War to the Sino-Japanese War. [1840-1894.]

During this period, the Imperialists accumulate rights and privileges in China. By the use of military force, they compel China to grant them many kinds of political ascendancy, by means of which they may firmly establish their powers of economic encroachment.

II. The second period runs from the Sino-Japanese War to the Boxer Rising. [1895-1900.]

During this period, the Imperialist Powers appear as rivals in China, competing with each other for rights and privileges. Each one, with military power ready in the background, strains every nerve to wrest from China, by threats or violence, every kind of political ascendancy from which economic encroachment may safely expand.

III. The third period runs from the Boxer Rising to the beginning of the Great European War. [1900-1914.]

This is the period when the Imperialists can employ freely their rights and privileges, for the purpose of economic encroachment.

China had surrendered to each of the Imperialist Powers, and had no mind or heart to resist them. The Powers needed not to use military force to

suppress her again. Their political ascendancy in China had already been firmly established ; their economic encroachment could proceed at will.

The pitiful Chinese people had survived the fear of national partition ; they could exist precariously under the shadow of the Balance of Power, and earn a living.

IV. The fourth period is from the beginning of the Great European War to the Washington Conference. [1914-1921.]

During this period, the Japanese Imperialists develop their methods of encroachment independently. The European nations, exhausted by their own war, had no energy to spare for China. Without opposition, the Japanese could use a free hand ; at times threatening armed violence ; at times putting forward, as puppets, one or more of the Chinese Militarists, by means of whom, especially, they acquired all kinds of political ascendancy and opportunities for economic encroachment.

V. The fifth period is from the Washington Conference up to the present.¹

Now was the time for all the Imperialists to adopt an uniform policy toward China, to promote economic encroachment.

¹ i.e From 1922 to 1925 (April), when this Draft was written. Up to June of this year (1926) there had been no material change in the situation here dealt with.

The 'inspired' assault, and temporary victory, of Wu Pei-fu and Chang-tso-lin had, as was intended, again deferred the day of discussion for the Imperialistic Powers.

Through the recent victories of the Nationalist Armies, the day of decision is now close at hand.

Each individual Imperialist Power had learned cunning during the European War : had seen that competition was only a waste of time, and of energy better spent in developing their encroachment, and a source of hatred and weakness.

Therefore, in the first place, they united in compelling Japan to vomit up what she had gained from China during the War ; and, secondly, they formed a combination of Britain, France, the United States, Italy, Japan, Holland, Belgium, Portugal, and the rest : and adopted a concerted attitude towards China, for the development of their economic encroachment.

The pitiful Chinese, seeing the other Powers force Japan to vomit out what she had devoured of China (like a fisherman forcing the fish from the throat of a crane),¹ claps his hands, and shouts delight ; nor notices that he himself has fallen into the net of international control.

¹ A traditional Chinese method of fishing is by means of birds, as the fowler might use a hawk.

THE FIRST PERIOD

FROM THE OPIUM WAR TO THE SINO-JAPANESE WAR
[1840-1894].I. *The Opium War.*¹

Before the Opium War, China's relations to the Powers had involved her in losses, such as the loss of Macao to Portuguese occupation ; but so far she had never been bound by treaties.

(The Sino-Russian 'Nibootsu' Treaty, contracted in 1689, appears to have been an equitable agreement.)

But in the period from 1840, when the Opium

¹ The object of England, in waging this war, has been interpreted in three ways :

- (i) England's determination finally to force the Chinese to open their country to foreign trade.
- (ii) England's determination to force opium—especially that of India —on China.
- (iii) England's desire for Imperial expansion by the possession of Hong-kong.

All these imputations are true ; in what proportion I do not profess to decide. I shall treat the points briefly in order :

(i) English trade with China started in the reign of Charles I. It was slight and precarious. In 1793 Lord Macartney obtained the Emperor's permission for the instalment of the British warehouses ('factories') in Canton. The Charter of Monopoly was held by the British East India Company until 1834, when Lord Napier was sent out as the first King's Representative.

Beginning with tea, the trade developed especially into the cotton and opium trades.

Throughout, the Chinese set themselves against the foreign trade. This was partly due to the Manchu policy of secluded obscurantism,

War with England commenced, until 1842, in the seventh month of which the Treaty of Nanking was signed, we have the first scene of China's tragedy, entitled 'Defeat in War.'

Now, too, begins the contracting of Unequal Treaties with the Powers.

Now, too, begins the Imperialistic encroachment in China.

The cause of the Opium War was very simple. China refused to allow England's importation of opium. England imposed that importation upon

partly due to the evil repute in which foreigners were held, owing to the bad class of Europeans who opened foreign relations with China in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. There had been constant friction; the British, like other foreigners, using force from time to time, and corruption of Chinese officials all the time. A certain mode of operation had thus been arrived at, degrading to both sides. But it worked, in a genre of its own. Nevertheless, a clash was inevitable, and there is no doubt that the English were waiting an opportunity. Unhappily for England, the clash came over the opium question.

(ii) *Opium.* Opium was used as a medicine in China certainly as early as 600 A.D. For smoking, it was introduced about 1650, from the Dutch Settlements in Java, mixed with tobacco (introduced thirty years before). Opium was not smoked by itself in China till just before 1800.

Foreign opium was first imported by the Portuguese. From the start the Chinese emperors tried to stop it. But foreigners, especially Portuguese and Americans, carried on a large trade in it.

From 1773 began the English importation from India, which steadily ousted all rivals, and was pushed with unprecedented energy. All over China, but particularly in the Canton area (England's point of penetration), opium made great headway. In 1800, a long series of Imperial Edicts culminated in that of the Emperor Kiaking, categorically forbidding its cultivation or importation.

But the traffic continued. The amount imported increased steadily from 1795 to 1820, doubled in the next seven years, ending in 1828; doubled again by 1835; and actually doubled again by 1839, when the year's import through English merchants totalled 40,200 chests, or about 3,323,200 pounds.

In 1839 the Imperial Court sent the Commissioner Lin Tse-siu to Canton, to stop the trade by any means.

The matter could not have been more intricate. The importation was largely carried on by smugglers all along the coast and islands of Kwangtung, which are ideal for such work. Captain Elliot, the British

China, by force. The right and the wrong are clear. No explanation is necessary.

The foreigners embroider their case by asserting that, in this war, the Western Powers were demanding from China diplomatic and commercial equality.

Equality. When China was allowed no freedom to prevent the importation of poisonous drugs. Equality.

But, worse yet, even in our own school text-books and lectures Chinese writers attributed, as the cause of this war, the severance of commercial relationships

representative, expressed his eagerness to co-operate with Lin, but adhered to the contention that the smuggling was a matter for the Chinese to suppress. Lin, a strict and drastic Chinese of the old school, held the Chinese doctrine of corporate responsibility. He not only forced the surrender of all stocks held by foreign merchants, which he destroyed. He also blockaded the foreign ships, and boycotted English trade, until all importation should cease.

In other ways, he took no trouble to conciliate the foreigners, and he has been accused of really desiring to put an end to all foreign trade. It is fair to state that his opposition to opium was genuine. He actually decreed the death penalty for smokers, or any Chinese found in possession of opium after a period of eighteen months' grace.

There followed, as a consequence of increased friction, the war of 1840.

That war the English have always interpreted as a war to extort open trading conditions from China. The Chinese, together with most foreigners, have interpreted it as a war to force Indian opium on China. (The other 'foreigners' have been delighted to enjoy the trading privileges gained by England, and have done as well as they could with opium.)

(iii) The treaty that ensued on China's defeat certainly bears out the truth of the Imperial expansion theory.

Also, unfortunately for the English case, the concessions by that treaty were taken advantage of by the opium interest. The island of Hong-Kong (ceded by the Nanking settlement) became a regular dépôt for the storing and import of opium. For this purpose, Chinese shippers were allowed, in contravention of British Mercantile Law, to purchase licenses for flying the Union Jack. It was this practice which led to the next Anglo-Chinese War in 1856. This war is known as the 'Arrow' War, after the ship of this class which was seized at Canton while flying the British flag (though, at the time of seizure, its license had expired, and it was contravening the Hong-Kong regulations by flying it at all).

On the whole of these subjects, compare also Wellington Koo's *The Status of Foreigners in China*, Ching-Lin Hsia's *Studies in Chinese Diplomatic History*, and Davis' *China and the Chinese*, vol. i.

with England. Even more terribly than opium itself has the poison of Imperialism corrupted our people.

2. *The Four Treaties.*¹

From the Opium War was produced the Nanking Treaty; and from this the Hoo-man [“Tiger-gate”] Treaty of the following year.

As a result, the Sino-American Treaty was signed in the sixth month of 1844, and the Sino-French Treaty in the ninth month of the same year.

These four treaties form a logical sequence.

The Nanking and Hoo-man Treaties were the result of China’s defeat in war by the English. But the war was no affair of France and the United States. Why, then, did these Powers demand equivalent treaties?

For three reasons.

First, because China, recently defeated in war, had no courage to fight the foreigner any longer.

Second, because the Manchu Government was foolish and pusillanimous, and its officials were relatives of the Royal Family, old men who were experts in the betrayal of China for money.

Third, a strong reason was that Britain, France, and the United States, with other nations, had worked together for obtaining these privileges and rights, because co-operation would bring them the booty. (Though, after the privileges were obtained, they

¹ Nanking Treaty, August 29, 1842.

Hoo-man Treaty (the ‘Treaty of the Bogue’), October 8, 1843.

Sino-American Treaty (Treaty of Wanghui), July 3, 1844.

Sino-French Treaty (Treaty of Whampao), October 24, 1844.

could not avoid rivalry amongst themselves, because the booty was not exactly shared out between them).

The 'Most-Favoured Nation' Clause.

Let us examine the Eighth Article of the Hoo-man Treaty.

' . . . it is further agreed, that should the Emperor hereafter, from any cause whatever, be pleased to grant additional privileges or immunities to any of the subjects or citizens of such [i.e. 'all'] foreign countries, the same privileges and immunities will be extended to and enjoyed by British subjects. . . .'

Also the Second Article of the Sino-American (Wanghui) Treaty provided :

' . . . And if additional advantages or privileges of whatever description be conceded hereafter by China to any other nation, the United States and the citizens thereof shall be entitled thereupon to a complete, equal and impartial participation in the same.'

Also Article VI. of the Sino-French Treaty (Whampao) provided that the merchants of France were to be treated in the same way as the most-favoured nation.

Ever after, each Power followed these precedents, and contracted with China on the same terms.

This clause is called the ' Most-Favoured Nation Clause.'¹ The Chinese phrase is ' Equal Opportunity of Privilege.'

¹ and has been included in every treaty between the Chinese and other nations from that time to this. The Sino-Soviet Agreement of 1922 is, in this as in other matters, an exception.

We must bear in mind that, whatever rights or privileges China hereafter once loses to any one nation, she must lose to all.

China's Losses by the Four Treaties.

I shall now show the extent of China's surrender of rights and privileges through these four treaties.

(i) *First, Cession of Territory.* According to the Nanking Treaty, the whole island of Hongkong was ceded to England.

This was the first cession of land by China.

Ever since, England has used Hongkong to cut China's throat.

(ii) *Second, Indemnity.* The Nanking Treaty provides that indemnity of \$21,000,000 is to be paid to England, by four yearly instalments.

The British Army, which occupied certain parts of China, was to evacuate on payment of the first instalment.

But the troops in Taushan and Kulangshiu would be withdrawn only after the total indemnity should be paid and the Five Ports opened.¹

This was the first occasion when China paid war indemnity. From now on, China's indemnity payments alone were designed to render her everlastingly a debtor.

(iii) *Third, the Establishment of Foreign Settlements in China.* According to the Nanking Treaty, China must open Canton, Amoy, Foochow, Ningpo and Shanghai, for foreign trade.

¹ The first Five Treaty Ports, specified in the next section.

It is often said, 'China should not adopt the Closed Door Policy. The opening of these ports was not extraordinary.'

But the opening of these ports meant allowing foreigners the privileges and immunities attaching to free residence and trade. The so-called 'residence and trade' involved gaining land, or territorial concessions, for erection of buildings. Foreigners could buy or rent buildings already existing, and erect churches and chapels.

Gradually these places became the 'Concessions.' Gradually the Chinese were excluded from these concessions. Within these concessions the administrative power is exclusively under foreign control. Not only do the foreigners there refuse to accept Chinese law; the Chinese there accept the foreign control. The so-called 'Concessions' are foreign territories, foreign sovereignties in China. The Imperialists in the concessions use their own military, police, and civil and criminal code; they also use the concessions as strongholds and headquarters in their encroachment and penetration of China.

(iv) *Fourth, the Acquisition of Extraterritoriality*, whose essence is expressed in the Chinese equivalent, meaning 'Consular Jurisdiction.'

What is Consular Jurisdiction?

Simply this.

The foreigners in China reject Chinese law and arbitration, in favour of their own consular arbitration. So that, while China's sovereign rights cannot

be exercised on Chinese territory, foreign sovereignty can be. A curious situation.

When the Imperialists have encroached on the countries of other peoples, their one great instrument has been ‘Extraterritorial Rights.’

Formerly, these rights were exercised in Turkey, Japan, and other countries. Now it is China’s turn.

We may see that the English code of law for foreign places provided definitely that the king or queen can exercise his, or her, extraterritorial power, according to the same rules, in places ceded or in conquered territory. Wherever extraterritorial rights are exercised, sovereignty goes with them.

Therefore, any nation within whose boundaries extraterritorial rights are allowed exercise, has lost its sovereign integrity.

The Nanking Treaty does not definitely provide for extraterritorial rights. But the Sino-French Treaty (Article xxvii.) provides for the Consul’s power of criminal arbitration ; and the Sino-American Treaty (Articles xxiv. and xxv.) definitely provides for his power of civil arbitration.

According to the doctrine of ‘Equal Opportunity of Privileges,’ England naturally enjoys the same immunities ; and afterwards all the other foreign countries obtained the privilege.

Extraterritorial rights are, I repeat, the first instrument of the Imperialists for encroachment into foreign countries. Their function is not only to rob us of national pride, but also to enable the foreigners to regard Chinese sovereignty as nothing.

Formerly the Chinese prevented foreigners from trading in China, regarding them as savages.¹ If

¹ There is a strange contrast between the reception given to foreigners in the thirteenth century, under the Mongol Dynasty, and the hostility and contempt for foreigners displayed during the modern contact with China from 1650 to 1900, under the Manchus. The explanation for the later condition is to be found in

(1) The deliberate policy of the Manchu Dynasty, which, effete and unpopular, believed that the 'Hermit' policy alone could stave off the day of reckoning. This belief was correct. The Revolution and the Republic would not have come so soon but for the growth, in South China, of Westernism.

(2) The behaviour of the foreigners during the modern opening up of China. At the beginning, the Chinese were friendly. But repeated tastes of the buccaneering adventureis who, here as in Peru and elsewhere, proved themselves thieves and shedders of blood, was followed by a policy in which commercialism appeared to represent Western civilization. Those who wish to understand the degree of cynicism reached by the commercialists cannot do better than read its summing up in Beresford's *Break-up of China*.

(3) In the thirteenth century, under Kublai Khan, the Chinese, under the Mongol, finally sated themselves with military glory. From then, they concentrated more and more on culture. The military profession sank into neglect, and, with higher culture, into contempt. Secure in their geographical isolation, the Chinese of the Central Empire became first indifferent, and then unaware, of the rest of the world. The invasion of their empire by ideals of militarism and commercialism long abandoned, and the necessity of adjusting themselves to the life of a nation among the modern nations, was like the renewal of a disquieting dream, long forgotten. For them, there remained the last shield of a vast aloofness, showing itself as contempt. They had also the memory of old triumphs against the West, ignorance of military and economic progress outside, and confidence that, if they cared to, they could repeat the old triumphs.

The aloofness, resulting from these causes, made China both irritating and obstructive to the eyes of the West; and only the conviction brought by repeated humiliations has at last convinced her that she must meet the world with modern weapons. But there is still a loathing of force, and the desire to achieve the end peacefully.

Let me quote from a letter written by a typical young Chinese of to-day:

'It is not from a motive of self-interest that we young Chinese are clamouring for our national self-determination and independence. We are inspired by genuine patriotism for our country, but we do not let our patriotism blind our sense of justice toward other nations. But we meet every obstacle in trying to realise our aspiration. Sometimes I am pessimistic towards the world, which is so full of hypocrisy and greed; but I am always hopeful that, in the long run, truth, justice, and all the better qualities of humanity will be triumphant.'

the foreigners would accept China's sovereignty, they could, without doing harm to China, travel and trade in China freely ; but, extraterritorial rights once gained, wherever the foreigners go there is the power of consular jurisdiction, with consequent injury to Chinese sovereignty. And the Chinese see the foreigners pursuing their Imperialism, and can do nothing against them.

Foreigners in China have established foreign banks, issued their notes, and controlled the Chinese money market. The Chinese financial authorities cannot control them.

Foreigners in China can establish schools, to propagate and promote their colonial education. The Chinese educational authorities cannot control them.

Foreigners in China, under the profession of preaching the gospel, have protected the Chinese Christians in the courts of law, and encouraged them to sue, and to victimise and hinder good people.¹

¹ Compare A. H. Michie, *The Englishman in China* (Edinburgh and London, 1900).

'What is it in the propagation of Christianity that excites the hostility of people and rulers? It is that the missionaries present themselves to Chinese view as the instruments of powerful nations bent on the ruin of the empire. They enter the country with a talisman of extraterritoriality; their persons are sacred; the law of the land cannot lay hands on them. That is the first stage. The second is, that they seek to extra-territorialize their converts also, whose battles they fight in the provincial courts and in the rustic communes, and so make it of material advantage to the people to bear the banner of the Cross. Many missionaries are really zealous in the work of alienating the Chinese from their natural allegiance, and of encouraging them to seek the protection of foreign Powers as against the native authorities. Thus a revolution of the most vital nature is in progress, and is being pushed on with all the energy which Christian, combined with ecclesiastical and political, zeal can throw into the work. Village is set against village, clan against clan, family against family, and a man's foes in China are too often they of his own household. . . While in theory they do not admit the claim of any foreign Power to

The Chinese legal authorities cannot control them.

In regard to none of these activities had the foreigners in the first instance any definite legal power. But, so far as they possess the right of consular arbitration, they can exercise such power without limit. It is very simple.

Therefore, extraterritorial rights constitute a far more serious encroachment on China than do the concessions. The concessions are definite ; extraterritorial rights are indefinite.

Certainly, with these two weapons, the Imperialists could do as they chose in China. They could cut her throat. She could not prevent them.

(v) *Fifth, the International Control of the Tariff System.* Any nation which has a foreign trade must have a Tariff System. That system must be controlled by the nation. For any nation which possesses tariff autonomy can at least exercise it in two ways :

- (a) Regulating the tariff rates for increasing the government revenue ;
- (b) Levying a high percentage of tariff rate upon certain commodities imported, in order to protect home industries.

protect Chinese subjects, yet in practice the thing goes on, and is acquiesced in. [So formidable, indeed, have the foreign missionaries become, that most of the provincial authorities are afraid as well as jealous of them ; and peace-loving viceroys give the simple injunction to their prefects and magistrates that on no account must they permit dispute with foreigners or native Christians. This means that the Chinese Christian must be upheld, right or wrong.]

With regard to the former, the tariff systems of all countries are, in the main, the same.

With regard to the latter, there is the Free Trade-Protection controversy. But in fact only one great country in the world—England—has adopted the Free Trade policy. And England could do thus only because her home industry was far advanced, and fit for free competition. The other great countries—ten to one—have adopted the Protective Tariff policy, which is designed to prevent excessive importation of foreign commodities : that is, to promote home industry, especially when it is backward. The Protection policy is held to be vital in such countries as are in the infant stage with regard to industrial machinery, the capitalistic system, and the organisation of factories.

An industrially backward country which fails to adopt the Protective policy, for the promotion of home industry and to enable immediate competition with advanced countries, is like an infant left to fight with a man.

Before the Opium War, China had been autonomous with regard to the tariff system, as, of course, is every country. But thereafter, by the Nanking Treaty, the Chinese Tariff System came under international control. Witness the Second Article of that Treaty :

‘ . . . and Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain, etc., will appoint Superintendents or Consular Officers, to reside at each of the above-named Cities or Towns (*i.e.* the Treaty Ports), to be the medium

of communication between the Chinese Authorities and the said Merchants, and to see that the just Duties and other Dues of the Chinese Government as hereafter provided for, are duly discharged by Her Britannic Majesty's Subjects.'

With this Article commenced the foreign consular supervision of Chinese tariffs.

Subsequently, these taxes came gradually to be collected from the foreign merchants by the foreign consuls, who handed over these revenues to the Chinese authorities, from the consulate.

The Tenth Article of the Nanking Treaty provided, in addition : ' His Majesty the Emperor of China agrees to establish at all the ports which are by the Second Article of this Treaty to be thrown open for the resort of British Merchants, a fair and regular Tariff of Export and Import Customs and other Dues, which Tariff shall be publicly notified and promulgated for general information, and the Emperor further engages, that when British Merchandise shall have once paid at any of the said Ports the regulated Customs and Dues agreeable to the Tariff, to be hereafter fixed, such Merchandise may be conveyed by Chinese Merchants, to any Province or City in the interior of the Empire of China on paying a further amount as Transit Dues, which shall not exceed 1 per cent. on the tariff value of such goods.'

In other words, the obligation of taxing justly is to be imposed on the Chinese people, and the Chinese Surtax is under international control.

Thus China loses customs autonomy.

In the fifth month of the year following the signing of the Nanking Treaty, the most considerable traders, belonging to the Manchu Royal Household and Relatives,¹ opened negotiations with England, at Hongkong, concerning the tariff rates for both import and export at the Five Ports ; also for the drafting of commercial regulations. In the eighth month they contracted the Hoo-man Treaty : according to which all imported goods were to be taxed at 5 per cent. *ad valorem*—except redwood, sanders wood, and box wood, brass, bronze, incense, and some other commodities ; all of which were to be taxed at 10 per cent. *ad valorem*.

International control of the tariff system was established.

From that time China's tariff autonomy was gone. China could not increase her tariff rates in accordance with the economic developments of the world, nor swell her government revenue as the domestic situation demanded. She could not adopt the Protective policy.

Therefore, Chinese handicrafts were overpowered by foreign machinery and industrial methods ; China's family system of production² was conquered

¹ A technical phrase which explains itself and much besides.

² Cf the old system of family craftsmanship in England. The Chinese, not carried away, as was the West, by the wonders of mass production in the factory, and having viewed its social results, are strenuously resisting even now its introduction, except where it can be managed on the most humane principles. Even so, they distrust it. Correctly, they look on it as the inevitable destroyer of their traditional family organisation, and, perhaps correctly, as offering no adequate compensation for the alienation of the people from the countryside.

by the foreign factory system ; conquered once and for all, without hope of restoration.

China is, day after day, relapsing further into economic backwardness.

The pitiful Chinese people to-day are advocating 'Promote Native Manufacture' and 'Win Back our Lost Privileges and Power.' A man in bondage might advocate physical exercise, for the promotion of health.

More pitiful is the so-called intellectual class, with its plea that 'foreign trade benefits both sides.'

Clearly, fair trade benefits both sides. But the foreigners, themselves enjoying tariff autonomy, force on China international control. Injustice and inequality insurpassable. Who talks of 'benefits to both sides'?

In the commercial treaties the burden of obligation rests on China.

Above all, China is in imminent peril of being forced along the road of pauperism and national bankruptcy.

Certainly, the international control of the Chinese Tariff System is a great success.

Results of the Four Treaties Summarised.

The five innovations mentioned above—cession of land, payment of indemnity, establishment of foreign settlements, granting of extraterritorial rights, and international control of the tariff system—are the most important subjects regulated by these four treaties.

We need not enter into details. These five innovations alone were enough to deprive China of her rights, rendering her permanently unfit to occupy an equal position in the family of nations.

Cession of land and payment of indemnity are the usual fate of a conquered nation. But the establishment of foreign settlements, the institution of extraterritorial rights, and the international control of the tariff system—these are the consequences only of the European attitude toward uncivilized races. In European countries they would never allow such loss of sovereignty. Only the so-called ‘inferior races’ do they regard as fit subjects for such treatment. This is their efficient method of obtaining political control. In order to get it they must resort to violence, manifested either in separate acts by individual nations or in combined action by ‘the Powers.’

3. *The Tientsin and Peking Treaties.*

We can safely assert that, by the four treaties resulting from the Opium War, the Imperialists have already bound China fast.

But they are not satisfied. An inch gained, they want a yard. In 1857 the forces of England and France united for war on China.¹

As the result, Canton fell into their hands ; and their fleets, together with those of the United States

¹ ‘The Arrow War,’ referred to in a previous note, was the beginning of this series of wars, which became a very large and serious conflict, the causes being, on the one side the accumulated ‘anti-foreign’ feelings of the Chinese in the face of Western penetration, and on the other

and Russia, went north to the mouth of the White River [Peiho] and destroyed the Taku Forts.

There followed the Tientsin Treaty, signed in the tenth month of 1858.

At the beginning of 1860 the united British and French forces again made war on China. Tientsin and Peking successively fell into their hands.

There followed the Tientsin Treaty, in the ninth month of 1860.

These two treaties brought worse suffering to China than did the Nanking Treaty.

(i) Regarding the cession of land: Kowloon, on the mainland opposite Hongkong, was ceded to England.

(ii) Payment of indemnities : England and France each got eight million taels.¹

The British and French forces were to be withdrawn only after the payment of the whole sum.

(iii) In addition to the Five Treaty Ports opened in accordance with the Nanking Treaty, eleven more were to be opened : Newchwang, Chefoo, Taiwan, Chaochow, Tansui,² Chunchow, Nanking, Chin-kiang, Kukiang, Hankow, and Tientsin.

side the determination to open the country to Western industry and investment.

There was bitter feeling on both sides, and much determined fighting. The great questions at issue were .

(1) Has a nation the right to cut itself off from commercial relations with other nations ?

(2) Have foreign nations the right to force on China types of commodity which are harmful to the Chinese ?

(3) The eternal question of race difference, and the refusal of the white races to treat others as equals.

¹ About £1,000,000. But to calculate the purchase power in China, you must multiply by ten at least.

² Taiwan, Chaochow and Tansui are in Formosa

Also, concessions were instituted in Tientsin and Hankow (in addition to that in Shanghai, provided for by the Nanking Treaty). Some of these concessions were under international, some under single-power, control.

The concessions in these three ports are the most important and prosperous concessions to-day.

Tientsin is the throat of North China, Hankow of Central China, Shanghai of South China. These three vital places became foreign administrative areas.

China's peril is very clear to see.

(iv) Extraterritorial rights are increased.

(a) Look at the Sino-British Tientsin Treaty, Article xvi. :

'Chinese subjects who may be guilty of any criminal act towards British subjects shall be arrested and punished by the Chinese authorities according to the laws of China.'

'British subjects who may commit any crime in China shall be tried and punished by the Consul or other public functionary authorized thereto according to the laws of Great Britain.'

'Justice shall be equitably and impartially administered on both sides.'

Hereby, the Mixed Court system was founded. Because of the obscure terms used in the Chinese version,¹ the civil and criminal codes are confused together in the treaties.

¹ 'British criminals are to be punished by Britain. Chinese people who bully or injure British subjects are to be punished by the Chinese local authorities. Negotiations occurring between the two nations are to be arbitrated by the just decision of both nations, that justice may be shown.'

It is also noteworthy that a Chinese defendant is to be examined in a Chinese court, in the presence of a foreign judge (Consul). But the foreign defendant is examined in the foreign court, without the presence of the Chinese authority.

Why ?

(b) Another point. By the Tientsin Treaty, foreigners in possession of passports signed by their own Consul can travel anywhere in China, even to the interior.

By the Peking Treaty, France can send missionaries freely. The missionaries can preach religious doctrine, buy land and erect buildings anywhere in the interior. When France obtained these privileges, the other nations regarded it as a precedent and demanded the same privileges.

Extraterritoriality now extends throughout all China.

(v) In regard to the Tariff System : The Nanking Treaty had provided that all imported goods were to be taxed at the rate of 5 per cent. The Tientsin and Peking Treaties added that a surtax of $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. was to be charged in addition to the import rate ; the goods were then to be free of further charges throughout the interior.

Hence the 'likin' (inland revenue)¹ system in China could affect Chinese, but not foreign, goods.

¹ 'Likin' is the name for all taxes imposed on goods during their transportation in the inland of China. Originally raised to meet the provincial contributions to the expense of the Taiping Rebellion, the tax has gradually spread all over China. Especially since the Boxer War, it has been employed more and more widely. During these last years

Look. Foreign goods, produced by the advanced and efficient mechanical system, by industrial capitalism and factory organisation, had a natural advantage in cheapness over Chinese goods, produced by Chinese domestic industry. Now, in addition, the Chinese goods are taxed and re-taxed, under the likin system, along the routes of transport, while foreign goods, after payment of one surtax, can be transmitted free of charge.

Under these conditions, what hope is there that Chinese goods, in China itself, may compete with foreign industry ? It is a dream.

To hope for competition with foreign industry in the world market, is a dream of a dream.

Further Results of the Tientsin and Peking Treaties.

The Tientsin and Peking Treaties resulted from China's defeat by the united forces of Great Britain and France. Therefore, the privileges obtained by Great Britain and France were almost the same. England obtained Kowloon besides ; but, in general, the balance was even.

But this war involved also Russia and the United States, which participated in the same game.

The United States had no share in the indemnities of anarchy it has become a method of raising money by any independent militarist who can set up posts on railways, canals, etc. Practically none of the money so collected, of course, finds its way to Peking. Also, it is a weapon of boycott. Many great foreign industrial enterprises have been almost 'frozen out,' largely by means of the 'likin' exactions with which, until the present anti-foreignism of China is ended, every Western enterprise is met.

The Kuomintang Party makes abolition of likin, in favour of a regular national tariff system, one of its main objects.

or in the cessions of land, but obtained certain profits, such as the expansion of settlements, the extension of extraterritorial rights, and modification of the tariff rates.

The other Powers also came forward to demand 'Equality of Opportunity.'¹

But Russia showed exceptional cunning, obtaining special booty, in addition to the common haul.

She played with the Manchu Government, handling it like a child. Russia signed a convention with the Manchu Government, in the twelfth month of 1860, specifying that the territories east of the Ussuri River, the Sungwatsin River, the Sinkai Lake, the Burling River, and the Tuman River, became Russian territory ; the land to the west of them remaining Chinese.

In addition, China and Russia determined the ownership of those areas bordering on the western territory (Sigang), which had not yet been defined.

By this convention China gave up her territory, from east to west, over twenty degrees of longitude ; and from south to north, over ten degrees of latitude. Russia hereafter established the Amur and Wingham provinces. Without cost, without so much effort as a cough, Russia acquired this immense new territory in Northern China, to establish the headquarters of encroachment, expansion and conquest.

The Peking and Tientsin Treaties meant China's surrender to Imperialism : so fast they bound her, that she is enslaved to-day. Through them, above

¹ Chinese : ' Equal Opportunity of Privileges.'

all, Imperialism has gained its hold on China : they are the corner-stone of the Unequal Treaties.

Let the Chinese people be kept in mind of them.

4. *The Taiping Revolution and Customs Control.*

Next, the Powers embraced the chance offered by the Taiping Revolutionary Uprising,¹ to extort freely from China every possible privilege.

These privileges and advantages were not based upon the treaties. They were wrested by burglary and brigandage. In time, they were regarded as natural and customary possessions.

For instance : the settlements in Shanghai expanded their sphere of civil administration and jurisdiction, converting the concessions into foreign territory.

Again, after the occupation of Shanghai by Liu-Lee-chwan,² the Shanghai officials of the Manchu Government fled. Therefore, all the Chinese Government offices (for instance, the Customs and Civil Administration offices) were emptied. All that time England, France, and the United States, each sent one inspector of customs, to carry on the work. Their administration was not merely an emergency device. It became permanent.

Moreover, because of the major influence of England, an Englishman, Thomas Wade, was appointed chief inspector ; and ever after the Customs

¹ Cp. note on p. 8.

² A Taiping Revolutionary General. He occupied Shanghai on September 7, 1853.

administration fell into the hands of Englishmen, and still cannot be regained. Nominally, the chief inspector was under the control of the Li Fan Yuen ;¹ and, in addition, every Chinese Customs office had a Chinese Customs commissioner, as adviser. But, even after this date, there was no central department of Customs, while the local offices were sinecures for members of the Chinese official class ; so that, in reality, the power was in the hands of the chief inspector, who could easily control the vast resources of Chinese finance.

Already the tariff rates had been decided by the Powers² ; now the foreigners could acquire administration of the Customs Houses. Hence, they held in their hands not only Chinese Government finance, but also the control of the people's living.

Our professed intellectual class—it shames me to write this—holds the opinion that 'China herself cannot administer the Customs Houses ; but must hand over their administration to foreigners, for the promotion of the public welfare and the avoidance of corruption.'

But is the Customs administration enough ?

Why not foreign administration for the whole of China ? That would be thorough.

5. England's Domination and the Chefoo Convention.

During the Taiping Revolution all the Powers, especially England, exploited the situation and obtained privileges and advantages. England also sent

¹ Foreign Department of the Cabinet.

² Cf. pp. 25-28.

soldiers to assist Tsêng Kuo-fan, Li Hung-chang, and other men of their type, to crush the Taipingtien-kuo.

From that time on, the Manchu Government forgot the deep humiliation of China through the Nanking and Tientsin Treaties, and went so far as to adopt England's patronage.

England exploited this opportunity, by assuming political and economic advantages without number ; so that, in 1864, the foreign trades statistics showed England's trade in China to be ten times as great as the total trade of all the other countries.

For the moment, England was quite contented. But in 1876 she pressed China to signing the Chefoo Convention.

England's excuse was that the English interpreter, Mr. Margary, had been killed in Yunnan by Chinese.¹

England's demands were :

- (i) That investigation should be made for a suitable trading centre, near Talifu, in the Yunnan Province.
- (ii) The opening of extra ports, such as Wuhu, Ichang, Wenchow, and Pakhoi.
- (iii) The appointment of a commercial inspector

¹ Mr. Augustus Raymond Margary was an interpreter, appointed from the Consular service, to accompany an expedition sent in 1874 by the British Indian Government to explore a route, through Burma and Yunnan, for the commercial exploitation of the wealthy provinces of Szechwan, Yunnan, and Kweichow.

After help and hospitality had been received from many influential Chinese gentlemen and officials, a portion of the main body was attacked, and Mr. Margary was murdered, together with six Chinese, by a body of Chinese peasants—the whole peasant population being known to be violently opposed to this foreign penetration, of which, indeed, they were notoriously very much afraid.

to Chunking, to investigate the economic possibilities of Szechuan.

(iv) That expeditionary battalions should be sent to Kiangsu and Chinghai,¹ as well as Thibet: and the Chinese Government should be obliged to protect them.

To these four demands England added further demands in the Chefoo Convention (signed in the third month of 1890). For instance, Chunking was to be opened as a treaty port. The 'influence' of England thereby extended from the mouth of the Yangtse River [Shanghai] to its highest point, Chunking.²

Here, also, began the exploitation of Thibet.

The above is a bare description of the developments which followed the Nanking Treaty—cessions of land, establishment of foreign settlements, acquisition of extraterritorial rights, international control of tariffs and customs.

I shall now tell of another happening, of equal importance.

This is the theft of the Vassal States.

6. *The Theft of the Vassal States.*

Between the Opium War and the Sino-Japanese War, China lost three vassal states. Annam was stolen by France, Burma by England, and Siam by England and France together.

¹ Chinghai = Kokonor.

² This 'sphere of influence' cuts through the richest territory of the provinces of Kiangsu, Anhwei, Szechuan, Yunnan, and Hupeh: the Yangtse Valley being the 'stomach' of China. Included in it are most of the great Treaty Ports, and it absorbs normally sixty per cent. of the entire foreign trade of China.

The details are these :

(i) France robbed China of Annam.

Annam was originally a vassal state of China. The relation between Annam and China was more intimate than that between China and either Siam or Burma ; more intimate even than the relation between China and Korea.

France's first attempt upon Annam was soon followed by the Sino-French War of 1884, and the resulting peace treaty in the fifth month of that year.

War broke out again, and resulted in another peace treaty, in the sixth month of 1885.

There followed the so-called 'Detailed Regulations,' in the fourth month of 1886 ; the Special Territorial Treaty, in the sixth month of 1887 ; and the development of the Commercial Treaty. Through these treaties China lost all her sovereign rights in Annam, and had to recognise Annam as a French Protectorate. China had also to open, as trading ports, Lungchow and Mengtsi.

Further, it was stipulated that, in future, China could not construct railways in the Southern Provinces, unless she employed French contractors and used French material.

China's loss was not confined, therefore, to the loss of Annam.

(ii) England robbed China of Burma.

When France had stolen Annam, England feared that the French might embark thence on an invasion of Burma, in order to threaten India.

Thereupon England grasped an unreasonable pretext¹ to open war with Burma ; captured the king, and subdued the country.

Burma having been originally a Chinese vassal state, China protested. England, far from yielding, went on to threaten China with a military expedition from India to invade Thibet.

China had to cede Burma.

In 1886 China and England agreed to the Burma Treaty, which recognised England's theft of Burma.

(iii) Siam was stolen by England and France.

France having stolen Annam, and England Burma, Siam lay between England and France. This situation was not only dangerous to Siam, but promoted direct conflict between the two great Powers.

Therefore, in 1893, England and France partitioned that part of Siamese territory called Nanchen, recognised formally the independence of Siam, and stopped her formal tribute to China.

They then agreed to make Siam a neutral state, in order to prevent conflict between themselves.

Afterwards, Siam gradually obtained independence. By great exertions, she freed herself of extraterritorial rights ; an abolition not secured, up

¹ ' In 1862 Lower Burma had been annexed to British India, but Upper Burma had been left under the rule of its king, though within the British sphere of influence. In 1886, however, for reasons which do not concern this history, but which were connected with French ambitions for expansion in the Far East, Upper Burma also was annexed to British India . . . etc.

Morse, *International Relations of the Chinese Empire* (vol. ii. ' the Period of Submission,' p. 372).

to the present, by Annam or Burma. Nor has China obtained it.

Upon China's loss of her vassal states I have some comments to record.

To take as vassal states the country of other men is unjust.

I firmly believe that the Chinese people to-day possesses no desire to regain the vassal states it has lost.

But the Chinese people does expect that those states will fight against the Imperialists, to regain their independence and liberty.

This achieved, they must themselves decide whether or not they wish to reunite with China.

For this we hope. We should decidedly not employ force.

Conclusion of the First Period.

Such are the facts of the encroachment on China by the Imperialistic Powers, from the Opium War to the Sino-Japanese War. From them we may judge how far, in this period, China was influenced by Imperialist penetration.

From this period onwards we shall find two political methods adopted :

(a) The Violent Method : That is to say, the immediate partition of Chinese territory, and the development of economic penetration within each territory so partitioned.

(b) The Slow Method : To avoid immediate partition ; and instead, to mitigate the conflict

between the Imperialist Powers, and to deceive the eyes and ears of the Chinese people, all the time using the superior political power already obtained as a means to economic encroachment within Chinese territory.

THE SECOND PERIOD

FROM THE SINO-JAPANESE WAR TO THE
BOXER RISING [1895-1900].1. *The Violent Method : Japan Sets the Pace.*

Before the Sino-Japanese War England was regarded as the only nation which had obtained supreme influence and the fullest privileges in China. Behind her came France and the United States of America. Russia's competition with England was confined to military and political matters in North China. She could not compete in economic matters.

Such was the general situation in the period dealt with above.

But, after the Sino-Japanese War,¹ there suddenly

¹ 1894-1895. War between pushing, Westernised Japan and conservative, misgoverned China, had threatened ever since 1870

The 'immediate cause' now was the 'buffer state' Korea, an ancient vassal state of China, which Japan had endeavoured to use as a stepping-stone for an invasion ever since the sixteenth century. Korea had reluctantly, under Japanese pressure, opened her frontiers to foreign influence, her sympathy and culture being Chinese.

Subsequently claimed by both China and Japan as a 'vassal' state, Korea now possessed both pro-Chinese and pro-Japanese parties—the former the great majority, the latter more highly organised. Japan desired Korea as a field of commercial expansion.

In 1894 a 'rebellion broke out' in Korea. Both China and Japan sent forces to restore order. The designed 'clash' ensued.

In the ensuing war the out-of-date Chinese Army was repeatedly defeated, and the Chinese navy (modern ships, but untrained complements) was dispersed.

China's complete defeat was recognised in the Treaty of Shimonoseki.

appeared Japan, ready to compete with England and Russia. The United States and France saw the dust but not the race.

During the Imperialistic invasion of the East, Japan and China had in the beginning met the same fate. Extraterritorial rights and the international control of tariffs had been chains forged on Japan also. To break them, Japan had exerted herself towards establishment as a Power. She both managed to solve her domestic difficulties¹ and entered upon a fixed foreign policy.

Japan's foreign policy had three stages :

(1) To free her hands by the reduction of neighbouring territories, such as the Liuchiu Islands and Korea ;

(2) To subdue China, so as to take her unique natural resources ;

(3) To fight against Europe and America, so as to maintain the international position of a first-class Power.

In pursuit of this policy Japan had, in the tenth month of 1871, taken the pretext of the Taiwan native problem to open war with China.²

¹ Mainly by the development of a constitutional monarchy.

² Some shipwrecked sailors from the Riukiu Islands (between Formosa and Japan) were maltreated by the Taiwan (Formosan) tribes. Formosa was then a part of the Chinese Empire. The Riukiu Islands were also dependencies of China. The Japanese Government, following China's refusal to punish the Riukiu islanders at their demand, sent a Japanese punitive expedition.

In 1874 the Japanese annexed the Riukiu Islands.

Both these actions were deliberately designed to produce war with China.

Since then, Japan had subdued the Liuchiu Islands and re-organised them under the name of Chung-Suen-Shien.¹

Further, Japan devoted herself to the Korean question : and finally, in the sixth month of 1894, there occurred the Sino-Japanese War.

The result of this war was the Makwan Treaty.² This treaty has twenty-one articles. The most important are these five :

- (i) China recognises Korea as an independent country.
- (ii) China must pay an indemnity to Japan for her military expenses, amounting to two hundred millions of taels [about £25,000,000].
- (iii) China conceded the Liaotung Peninsula, Taiwan [the Formosan Islands], and the Penhu Archipelago.
- (iv) China undertook to treat Japanese officials and subjects according to the treatment accorded to the 'most favoured nations.'
- (v) China undertook to open Shasi, Chunking, Soochow and Hangchow as Treaty Ports.

Afterwards, Russia, France and Germany united in forcing Japan to return the Liaotung Peninsula ; for which concession China had to pay thirty millions of taels.

The total loss of China, by this treaty, was not confined to the huge indemnities and the cession of large territories. For Japan obtained in addition almost all the privileges obtained by the other

¹ The Chung-Suen Group.

² The Shimonoseki Treaty.

Powers by, and after, the Nanking Treaty. She became a 'most favoured nation.'

To the imperialism of Europe and America was added the imperialism of Japan.

Worse followed.

All the Powers, seeing the privileges derived by Japan from this war, became frightened of losing ground in the race, and, in their struggle for primacy, competed with each other in their adoption of the violent policy of encroachment. They demanded from China concessions and spheres of influence.

During the period from the Sino-Japanese War to the Boxer Rising, the clamour for the partitioning of China reached its climax.¹ Let us examine in detail the schemes for this partitioning.

2. Schemes for the Partition of China.

A. Demands for Concessions. In the eleventh month of 1897 two German missionaries were killed by the Chinese—at Kueyehshien in Chaoshoo-fu, in the Shantung Province.

Taking this pretext, Germany sent a fleet to occupy Kiaochow, and her Far-eastern cruiser squadron to threaten China.

As a result, a treaty was formulated in the third month of 1898.

Kiaochow, with both its coasts, was to be conceded to Germany, on a ninety-nine years' lease. During this term the Chinese Government should

¹ Compare, e.g., Lord Beresford's "The Break-up of China." (London, 1899.)

forego its sovereignty in these concessions in favour of Germany.

Moreover, Germany obtained the privilege of constructing the Kiaochowan-Tsinan Railway. Within one hundred li¹ of the railway Germany had freedom to open mines.

Lastly, it was stipulated that, should China desire to undertake any new enterprises in the Shantung Province, Germany should have the preferential privilege for the supply of such foreign capital, or other assistance, as should be required.

By this treaty China lost not only Kiaochowan but the whole Province of Shantung.

Then France, in her turn, asked China to arrange the Kwanchowan Concession Treaty, for a term of ninety-nine years.

This treaty was signed in the eleventh month of 1898. China further recognised the privilege of France to construct a railway, with telegraphs, between Tsekan and Ampu.

Then England took the pretext of the Kwan-chowan Concession to France, and demanded that the whole area of the Kowloon Peninsula should be conceded to England, as a counterbalance to the French concession.

Therefore, the month after the drafting of the Sino-French Treaty, China, at England's demand, drafted the Kowloon Concession Treaty, by which England took over the Peninsula of Kowloon, together with the large and small groups of islands,

¹ A *li* is about one-third of a mile.

numbering over forty, in the vicinity of Hongkong, including two gulfs and the neighbouring seaboard.

All were conceded on a ninety-nine years' lease.

The example of Kiaochowan supplied the Powers with another precedent for seeking concessions in China.

Russia immediately followed suit.

In the third month of 1898 Russia made a treaty with China, arranging for the concession of Linsuen and Daren. The terms were :

(1) The period of the concession was twenty-five years.

(2) China recognised Russia's privilege of constructing the branch railways along the coasts of the Liaotung Peninsula, to connect with the East Manchurian Railway : the same terms applying as those which governed the construction of the East Manchurian Railway.

In the seventh month of the same year the additional treaty was signed, providing that the branch railways might be prolonged to Kirin.

England then took the pretext of the concessions, given by China to Russia, of Lushun and Taliewan [the Gulf of Daren], and requested China to arrange the treaty making Weihaiwei a British concession.

The treaty was signed in the seventh month of 1898.

The term of the concession was to be the same as that for Linsuen and Darenwan [25 years].

There is a legal distinction between concessions and ceded lands. In practice, they are the same.

Moreover, the main object of the Powers, in obtaining concessions, is the construction of naval bases and forts.

Up to the present, China has not only opened her doors. She has allowed others to occupy her house to its very centre.

B. The Determination of Spheres of Influence. The theory of the determination of spheres of influence took its rise from Imperialistic policy in Africa.

In the early days the European Imperialists, who went to Africa, strove to occupy the territory, while avoiding conflict with each other.

They therefore determined 'spheres of influence' mutually recognised. The people of Africa were not regarded. The 'spheres of influence' once determined, the various properties had found their masters.

Therefore, the determination of spheres of influence may be regarded as the preliminary to partition.

In those early days the Imperialists, when dealing with China, recognised 'spheres of influence' for practical purposes.

For instance, England regarded the territories along the Yangtse Basin as her special sphere of influence. The Kwangtung, Kwangsi, and Yunnan Provinces were so regarded by both England and France (an arrangement which threatened to bring them into conflict).

Mongolia, Chinese Turkestan, Manchuria, and
s.c. D

the districts along the north of the Yellow River, were regarded as the Russian sphere of influence.

After the rise of Japan the Manchurian territories could not survive the conflict between Japan and Russia.

The Shantung and Fukien Provinces were regarded as tit-bits exclusively reserved for Germany and Japan respectively.

Such were the facts. But they were not specified in writing.

Russian diplomacy, in particular, relied on cunning, and insisted on practical results while avoiding formulas.

With regard to France ; the treaty signed after the Sino-French War provided :

‘ In future, if railway construction shall be undertaken in the Southern Provinces, Frenchmen shall be employed and French materials used.’

Germany’s Kiaochowan Treaty provided :

‘ If China desires to undertake any new enterprises in the Shantung Province, Germany shall have the preferential privilege for the supply of such foreign capital, or other assistance, as shall be required.’

Such stipulations, literally taken, contain the sense of establishing spheres of influence.

In the beginning of 1898 England openly made an agreement with China, specifying that none of the territories along the Yangtse River could be conceded or mortgaged, or, under any other form, handed over to any other nation. In the previous

year France had already framed an agreement with China, whereby China could not concede Hainan Island to any other nation. Since then, France had gone a step further, by stipulating that China might not cede Kwangtung, Kwangsi, and Yunnan to any other nation.

Therefore Japan also demanded that China should undertake never to cede Fukien to any other country.

The Powers thus had their spheres of influence in China clearly and unmistakeably determined.

The Chinese melon was ready for quartering out at any convenient opportunity.

3. The Second Period Summarised.

These methods—concessions, spheres of influence, and so on—were the new devices introduced after the Sino-Japanese War.

Their significance is plain.

The Imperialist statesmen had decided to adopt the violent method with regard to China; to expand their military power in the country, with a view to establishing the political dominance necessary for the thorough development of their economic penetration.

THE THIRD PERIOD

FROM THE BOXER RISING TO THE BEGINNING OF
THE EUROPEAN WAR [1900-1914.]*General Survey of the Period.*

The Boxer War is a pivotal point of Chinese history.

A. The Boxer War indicated the changed attitude of the Chinese towards the Imperialists. From the Opium War to the Boxer Rising the Chinese had shown an exasperating patience. But now they determined to resist by force.

The Boxer War, like the wars that had preceded it, left China utterly defeated.

But worse than utter defeat was the growing realization of the Chinese, after the Boxer War, that they had no hope of gaining the power to resist the Imperialists. They had neither the mind nor the courage to war with the Powers.

Yet, despite this humble restraint from an outbreak against the Powers, China's very existence became most precarious : being threatened nearly, for instance, by the Russo-Japanese War, fought in the three Eastern Provinces ; by the war of Japan against Germany, when the Japanese violated China's neutrality in the Shantung Province ; and by the

Japanese ultimatum to the Peking Government, the notorious Twenty-one Demands.¹

These menaces were intolerable. China must fight.

But she did not. She kissed the rod.

She thus acquired a kind of double personality.

The blame for this must be laid upon the weak Manchu Government, and thereafter upon the Government of Yuan Shih-kai, both of which sought favour from the foreign Powers.

Nevertheless, the people felt the humiliation.

B. The Boxer War also marked a turning-point in the conduct of the Imperialists towards China. As I have said, all the Powers had adopted, after the Sino-Japanese War, the violent method against China.

But now, after the Boxer War, they all changed their policy to one of gradual encroachment. The reasons for this were very complex, but two predominated.

(1) Conflicts between the Powers were latent everywhere in China, and might easily burst into fire.

As soon as the Powers adopted the violent method of encroachment, they grew dangerous.

After the Sino-Japanese War, China was excluded from Korean affairs. Russia interfered. Japan and Russia were forced to quarrel, both on China's doorstep in Korea, and further afield, as in Manchuria.

After the intervention of Russia, Germany and

¹ These are fully dealt with in the Fourth Period.

France in the Liaotung affair, Japan was quite ready to take Russia as the object of a second war. It was not, however, until Russia, during the Boxer War, despatched troops to the three Eastern Provinces [Manchuria], with the object of seizing Korea, that Japan declared war.

The Russo-Japanese War benefited nobody. Russia was defeated ; but Japan was led into a very dangerous position.

England and France narrowly escaped being involved ; the one through her alliance with Japan, the other through her alliance with Russia. Nor could the other Powers comfortably maintain an armchair attitude.

What this War did was to prove that the Powers must either change their violent policy of encroachment in China or fight amongst themselves.

In this world, with its creed of 'Might is Right,' the contact of the strong with the weak always obeys the old saying, 'The weak for chains ; the fool for tribute ; the feckless for robbery ; the helpless for the bludgeon.'

But when a Power meets a Power, both must be cautious, according to the motto, 'Fear a sword, and be wary of battle.'

Therefore in truth the Powers changed their policy, and adopted the slow method of encroachment.

(2) The second reason developed out of the Boxer War.

Although the Powers obtained victory over China, they saw that the Chinese people not only were able

to resist them formidably, but also deeply hated them, knowing that this war had been brought on by the violent method of encroachment adopted since the Russo-Japanese War.

Now, had there been no alternative to this violent method, the Powers must inevitably have pursued it to the end. But, possessing another means of achieving their economic invasion, they altered their policy. They adopted the slow method.

What is the slow method of encroachment ?

As already explained, it meant an end to the partition of Chinese territory. Conflicts among the Imperialists were thus avoided, and the Chinese people were blindfolded. At the same time, the Powers could push their economic invasion of Chinese territory, by means of the political ascendancy already obtained.

We thus understand that the difference between the violent and slow methods is of technique, not of aim : the difference between immediate partition of territory and delayed partition.

The violent method enables the Powers to pursue their economic invasion, each within its assigned territory ; the slow method, developing out of the political ascendancy already attained, enables them to pursue collectively a co-operative policy of encroachment all over China.

The violent method, if carried to its conclusion, would bring about the partition of China.

The slow method, if carried to its conclusion, would bring international control.

The pitiful Chinese, terrified by the violent method, feel comfortable in the presence of the slow method. As if acute disease is disease, and wasting sickness is health ! As if cholera kills, but tuberculosis cannot !

The above is a summary description of the attitude taken by the Powers toward China, from the Boxer War to the European War.

I shall now describe the events in detail.

2. *The Boxer War and its Treaty.*

The Boxer¹ Rising began in the summer of 1900.

According to the traditional ideas held by the secret societies² in China, its object was 'To overthrow the Manchu Government and to restore the Ming Dynasty.'

But, owing to the hostility aroused by Imperialism since the Opium War, the aim was also 'To overthrow the foreigners and Christianity.'³

The original idea of the Boxer Society, then, was 'To overthrow the Manchu Government and the foreigners.' But, unfortunately, the Manchu Empress Dowager and the Royal Household after-

¹ 'The Righteous Fraternity of Fist-fighters' is as near as we can get to the original Chinese name.

² There is no doubt that, ever since the first formation of the Manchu Dynasty, secret societies had existed for the purpose of restoring China to a Chinese Government.

Such societies became stronger and more determined during the last century of the Manchu decline ; and were largely instrumental, together with the new revolutionary societies, mentioned in the Introduction, in bringing about the Revolution of 1911. The history of this side of China's Republican history will almost certainly remain unwritten ; but its importance it is impossible to estimate.

³ Cf. note on p. 23.

wards exploited the Boxer Society, which became an instrument for 'maintaining the Manchu Government and overthrowing the foreigners.'

Because the Boxer flag was inscribed with 'Overthrow the Foreigners,' the united forces of eight Powers took action.¹

Peking was captured, and the resulting Peace Treaty of 1901 contracted. Its most important items are :

(1) The payment of the Boxer Indemnity, amounting to four hundred and fifty millions of taels [about £50,000,000].

Formerly, after the war against England and France combined, China had been compelled to pay an indemnity of eight millions of taels to each of these nations : these sums being derived from the Customs revenue,² and paid out in 1865.

China's indemnity to the Japanese, together with the indemnity in compensation for the recovery of the Liaotung Peninsula, amounted to 230,000,000 taels [about £26,000,000] ; a sum which was also secured by Customs revenue. This Boxer indemnity must also, of course, be secured by Customs revenue.

The annual Customs revenue would be used first for payment of indemnities. The so-called surplus would be handed to China.

From this time on, in addition to the international control of the tariff and the foreign administration

¹ England, Germany, Russia, France, the United States, Japan, Italy.

² Cf. p. 30.

of Customs, our Customs revenue is reserved primarily for satisfying the foreigners. The offscourings are left for China.

(2) China must demolish the Taku Forts,¹ and the fortifications between Tientsin and Peking.

The Powers were to be permitted, for the preservation of safe transit between Tientsin and Peking, to station troops at Peking, Huangtsun, Langfang, Yangtsun, Tientsin, Chuntiangtam, Tangkoo, Lutai, Tanshang, Lwanchow, Changli, Chingwangtow, Shanhaikwan, and other places.

Within twenty li [seven miles] of Tientsin Chinese troops must not be stationed, nor anywhere adjacent to this area.

(3) Determination of the areas of the Legation quarters in Peking. Within these areas the police force to be under complete control of the Legations. Troops could also be stationed there, and any type of fortifications established.

Thus the area of the Legation quarters in Peking was not merely the political area, but the armed political area, of the foreign Powers.

Big guns were emplaced at Nanchen [*i.e.* the

¹ The Taku Forts, defending the mouth of the Peiho River, and commanding the approach to Peking. Like the famous Bocca Tigris forts, commanding the approach to Canton, they have an interesting history in modern times: having been attacked by the French and British in 1840; captured by them, then successfully defended against them, and recaptured—all in 1858; destroyed in 1899, after an heroic defence, by the allied European and Japanese forces (this act precipitating the Boxer War); and demolished, as part of the peace terms of 1900. Recently, in the spring of 1926, the Powers forced their evacuation by the National forces of Feng Yu-shiang, the Christian general, thus making certain his temporary defeat by the Northern Militarists, Wu Pei-fu and Chang Tso-lin.

South City], which at any moment could demolish Peking.

As a result, the Peking Government could be played with at will by the Powers.

Thus, the Legations at Tang-Chow-Ming-Shang ['the Legation Area'] became in reality a supreme government in Peking.

The Boxer Treaty of 1901 robbed China of many sovereign rights, and crushed the national pride.

The items mentioned here are no more than the most important illustrations of this fact.

Hereafter, can we maintain that China is to be regarded as a free and independent country?

3. Relationships of the Powers after the Boxer War.

(a) *The change from the violent to the slow method.* Russia took the pretext of the Boxer affair to send troops to Manchuria with the professed object of occupation. This hasty and violent action against China flouted not China merely, but also the Great Powers, who took fright.

The first to take fright was England; whose trade with China held unquestioned supremacy. Russia must not be allowed so free a hand. But England's military force in China could not oppose that of Russia.

Gone was England's self-satisfaction, the heritage of the Opium and Sino-English-French Wars.

Therefore England, head-over-heels in her eagerness, signed a treaty with Germany, in the tenth

month of 1900, forestalling co-operation between Russia and Germany in Shantung.

Afterwards, she allied with Japan, in the first month of 1902. She depended on Japan's military force to counter Russia. On this alliance followed the Russo-Japanese War of 1904.

The United States, though not on the pretext of balance of power, enjoyed concessions and extra-territorial rights, and shared in the control of tariffs, on the same footing as the other Powers.

Nevertheless, the United States have never alone begun a war with China, nor obtained advantages from the partition of Chinese territory.

During 1898, when all the Powers were jostling each other and clamouring for concessions and spheres of influence, the United States feared that they would be elbowed out of the scramble for the Chinese melon. Moreover, the situation of the United States rendered advisable for them the slow method in China, since they were superior in financial influence but inferior in military force.

Therefore, between the ninth and twelfth months of 1899, the U.S. Secretary of State, Mr. Hay, had sent notes to Japan, England, France, Russia, Austria and Italy, in which he proposed maintaining China's 'Territorial Integrity,' the 'Open Door Policy,' and 'Equality of Opportunity.'

At that time all the Powers had agreed in name, and in name only.

But after the Boxer and Russo-Japanese Wars, the 'Integrity of Territory,' the 'Open Door Policy,'

and ‘Equality of Opportunity’ became really embodied in the policies of the Powers, and appeared as newly-discovered catchwords in all the treaties : the Anglo-German Treaty with China, the second and third Anglo-Japanese Treaties of Alliance in 1905 and 1911, the Franco-Japanese and Russo-Japanese Treaties in 1907, the second Russo-Japanese Treaty in 1910, the Japanese-American Agreements in 1908 and 1917.

(b) *The catchphrases of the slow method.* Such were the three catchphrases produced by the period of slow encroachment : just as ‘concessions’ and ‘spheres of influence’ had been produced by the period of violent encroachment.

I must give some description and explanation of the three new terms.

What is ‘Integrity of Territory?’

This phrase is used to signify the partitioning of territory.

It signifies, not the dissection of China, for distribution to the Powers for their enjoyment : but the handing over of China to them entire, for collective enjoyment.

What is the ‘Open Door Policy?’

This phrase signifies that China should welcome the Powers when they come to exercise their encroachment. There must be neither hindrance nor resistance ; neither barricade nor concealment.

China must just allow the Powers to satisfy themselves howsoever they choose.

What is ‘Equality of Opportunity’?

In plain words, this means ‘Everybody has a share.’

Any nation, having once established in China a sphere of influence, or spheres of interest, may enjoy its privileges and advantages without disturbing the privileges and advantages of other nations. Moreover, in the future, should opportunity arise of demanding privileges and advantages in China, all the nations must get equal slices, none thicker or thinner, none heavier or lighter.

Some people ask, ‘Integrity of Territory, the Open Door Policy, Equality of Opportunity ! Why do these so vitally injure China ? ’

We answer immediately and surely : Because the Powers have already stipulated with China a number of Unequal Treaties, enabling them to exercise in all ways superior political power, for the carrying out of economic encroachment.

Therefore the result of their policy, from A to Z, will be to expand the area of such encroachment daily, and daily to increase its degree.

Is not this vital injury to China ?

For example ; apart from extraterritorial rights, we do not mind any number of foreigners living in China. But, so long as these continue, every additional foreigner in China is an additional curse.

Again, apart from the international control of tariffs, we should not mind opening as many ports as possible. But, so long as this continues, every additional port opened in China is an additional curse to her.

This argument may be applied throughout.

4. The Investment Period.

(a) *Railway Control.* The Powers, having agreed concerning their mutual interests, invested money in China on a large scale. Their relationships decided, conflict was reduced to a minimum. Moreover, perceiving China so disheartened after the Boxer War, and lacking the desire and the power to resist penetration, they could invest without fear.

The Powers invest money in China for two purposes : first, for the sake of the profit accruing from prosperous undertakings ; second, to promote their national influence.

Of the various profitable enterprises the most important is railway development. This now became very lucrative.

For instance, Russia possessed the East Manchurian Railway, Japan the South Manchurian and Anfung Railways, obtained after the Russo-Japanese War.

In name, as in fact, these railways were foreign railways in Chinese territory. They were, in other words, foreign territory extended through Chinese territory. Moreover, under the pretext of protecting these railways, foreign police were to be established and foreign soldiers stationed. And, lastly, the lands adjacent to the railways were to be assigned to foreign Powers, as the so-called ' Areas of Control ' of the railways. These gradually became areas of foreign civil administration.

China's loss, with regard to these railways, was a loss of territory.

The Yunnan-Annam Railway was controlled by France, and the Kiaochow-Tsinan Railway by Germany.

No definite political power went with these railways. But being, in reality, under foreign control, their significance was the same as that of the Russian and Japanese Railways.

In all these railways the foreigners possessed not only special facilities for encroachment in China, but also potential military transport.

For example : should China desire to fight against Japan ; Japan, by her South Manchurian Railway, could flood the three Eastern Provinces, and also use the ' Controlled Area ' as a military base.¹

There were next the railways controlled by China and financed by foreigners.

Such are the Peking-Hankow, Kwangtung-Hankow, Hankow-Szechuen, Peking-Fengtien, Tientsin-Pukow, and Shanghai-Nanking Railways.

The rights of these railways were in no danger of surrender to foreigners. But each company was under contract to the capital of a particular Power, which could obtain all kinds of advantages with regard to it.

These advantages comprised not only the extension of economic interests along the route, but also the promotion of political interests.

Therefore competition, regarding investment in railway enterprises, was not confined to the foreign

¹ Mr. Putnam Weale has well remarked, on this subject, that, above all else, the railways of a nation are the symbols of its sovereignty.

capitalists. Behind the scenes, the foreign governments supported them.

(b) *The Consortium.* It is important for us to realise, also, that the problem of railway investment was behind the organisation of the Banking Consortium, as a result of which the Powers united to exercise financial bondage over China, in the form of financial control.

Whatever else we may forget, this must never be forgotten.

In 1898 the American China Development Company had obtained the constructive and administrative rights of the Canton-Hankow Railway.

In 1905 China was prepared to redeem them.

It was then decided that the parts in the Kwangtung Province should be constructed by private enterprise; the parts in Hunan by private enterprise co-operating with the Chinese Government, and the parts in Hupeh by the Chinese Government.

Afterwards, Hunan and Hupeh, lacking capital, asked England, France, and Germany to contract a loan in the sixth month of 1909. As a result, a consortium of three Powers was formed. Soon after, as the result of a protest from the United States in the third month of 1910, the United States was allowed to join this consortium, which became the Four-Power Group.

The total amount of this loan was to be £6,000,000.

Soon after, the United States initiated the Currency Reform Loan, amounting to £10,000,000, and induced England, France, and Germany to join her.

This loan was also in the hands of the Four-Power Consortium. It was made in the fourth month of 1911.

In March¹ 1912 Japan and Russia formally joined the group. The Four-Power Consortium had become a Six-Power Consortium.

(c) *The Consortium and the Chinese Republic.* For many years past the Imperialist Powers—England, Russia, Germany, France, Japan, and the United States—had pursued their Imperialistic policies towards us.

Now they co-operated in their treatment of the new-born Chinese Republic.

Unfortunately for us, Yuan Shih-kai's Government was then in control. The Six-Power Consortium endeavoured, not without success, to induce him by every means to push their policy.

The United States, considering intervention in Chinese politics to be against their principles, ordered the American banking group to withdraw.

The Consortium, now of five Powers, carried on their policy as before.

In April, 1913, the Big Loan, amounting to £25,000,000, was floated. The period of this loan is forty-seven years, and it is secured by the Salt Gabelle² as the main security, the secondary security being the Customs revenues; and the subordinate security consisting in the revenues paid to

¹ The change, at this point, in the dating is due to the introduction of the Reformed Calendar, by the new Chinese Republic, in January 1912.

² The Salt Revenue has since been in the hands of the Central Salt Administration under foreign control, since the Great War almost entirely British.

the Central Government by the provinces of Chihli, Shantung, Hunan, and Kiangsu.

In addition, the Consortium obtained first claim on China, in her payment of Public Debts.

The success of this Big Loan, of course, made the Imperialist Powers lift their voices in a chorus of victory which we need not describe.

As for China, in addition to the accentuation of the foreign menace, her internal danger was now extreme. ‘The deeper the water, the hotter the fire.’

In the first place, the Big Loan was never assented to by Parliament. Its acceptance constituted a precedent for disregard of parliament and violation of the constitution.

In the second place, Yuan Shih-kai used this Big Loan to fight against the Revolutionists, in order to establish a monarchy for himself.

Thirdly, the loan thus set up the evil precedent, by which Chinese Governments should seek favour from foreign Powers in exchange for the betrayal of their country.

In truth, this Consortium was a curse to China.

It is most interesting to note that the Consortium, originally established for the Railway Loans, became, after 1912, responsible for political loans almost entirely: industrial and railway loans being thenceforward exceptional. This charge was made upon the suggestion of England, the other Powers concurring.

Why was this?

The object of Imperialism is economic encroachment, which depends upon political ascendancy.

Therefore, the Powers must co-operate unanimously in the matter of political loans ;¹ while other loans, being less important, may be made at discretion independently by any of the Powers.

What I have here mentioned concerning the investments of the Powers in China, shows that the railway enterprises were the most important ; and that these caused the Consortium of Three Powers, followed by those of Four, Six, and Five Powers, in turn.

Hence, starting with railway loans, we come naturally to the political loans.

This is the importance of the record.

(c) *Some Further Politico-Economic Developments.*

A few more facts need mention.

The privileges of opening mines of coal, iron, etc., were handed over by the Chinese either as additions to the railway rights or independently.

The privilege of opening up the timber forests—such as the district along the Yalu River—and of cutting the wood, was given to the foreigners.

The rights of pasturage and the fisheries went the same way. Instance Russia's privilege of establishing huge grazing lands in Northern Manchuria and Sanshin.

These privileges had not only economic but also political significance, in the matter of extraterritorial rights and so on, similar to the privileges attaching to railway construction. They helped in the development of a general partitioning policy.

¹ This rule is stated as applying to this Period of Slow Encroachment.

We must constantly guard against being fooled by talk about ‘Exploitation of natural resources being beneficial to both sides.’

Notable, too, is the opening up of our inland waters, in 1898, to navigation by foreign steamers.

For instance, the Yangtse River, from the upper reaches to the mouth,¹ was entirely opened to foreign navigation—a very shuttle of the Imperialist fabric.

Foreign railways on the land ; foreign steamers in the waters ; up and down, back and forth, at will.

The ‘Open Door Policy’ was indeed a special invention for China. Where is the like, I ask, in any country of the world ?

(d) *Other Means.* Other means there are, beside treaties and agreements. They are informal or secret arrangements, such as the foreign management of ports.

With such measures China has not interfered ; the foreigners have adopted them without argument.

At the time of the Washington Conference it was settled that foreign administration of the Post Office should be withdrawn. A new favour, this.

Such confused and underhand dealing is beneath our discussion, except for a sigh.

The ‘Slow Method’ Reviewed.

The above-described system of ‘investment’ by the Powers had progressed before the Boxer War. Then it headed downstream a hundred miles a day.

¹ Cf. note on p. 38.

In this progress all the Powers paid much attention to evolving a common method.

From the military standpoint, this policy is truly 'slow'; but from the political, and especially the economic, point of view it is, I make bold to say, more violent than was the violent method itself, even at the climax of the demand for the partition of China.

5. The Partition Policy Continued, as a Weapon Against the Chinese Republic.

Investment enterprises were naturally characteristic of this period, as we have seen.

But the Partitioning Policy was by no means abandoned.

Any opportunity of partitioning, which involved neither great effort nor danger of inducing a conflict between the Powers, was violently seized.

For instance, in August, 1912, the British Minister to Peking, Sir John Jordan, suddenly handed to the Chinese Foreign Office a note containing the following demands :

- (i) The British Government forbade China to interfere with the general politics of Thibet.
- (ii) The British Government demanded that Chinese officials should cease from exercising political power in Thibet; and that China should no longer regard Thibet as being on the same footing as the other Chinese provinces.
- (iii) The British Government would not allow Chinese troops to be stationed within 'Thibetan territory' ;

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(iii) The British Government would not allow Chinese troops to be stationed within 'Thibetan territory' ;

And (iv.) After the above items had been agreed to by China, England might recognise the Chinese Republic.

At the same time, Sir John Jordan threatened that, unless the Chinese Government conceded these demands, England would carry on direct negotiations with Thibet.

England's ambition in Thibet—no new ambition—was hereby exposed.

But most hateful was the bartering, in exchange for these items, of England's recognition of the Chinese Republic.

Moreover, the Racial Revolution had united the Han [Chinese proper], the Manchurians, the Mongolians, the Chinese Mohammedans of Turkestan, and the Thibetans, on equal terms. If, at the beginning of the Republic, Thibet was to be cut off, the Chinese Republic was ruined. The flag was torn already.¹

¹ The Chinese Republican Flag is in five Stripes, for the Five Peoples : The Han-Man-Mung-Huai-Tsan.

The Han (Chinese proper) has a red stripe ; the Man (Manchurian) a yellow ; the Mung (Mongolians), blue ; the Huai (Mohammedans), white ; and the Tsan (Thibetans), black

This flag was devised by Sung Chiao Jen, a leading member of the Revolutionary Party, who prepared it, and had many copies of it made in advance.

On the first day of the Chinese Republic Dr. Sun Yat-sen requested all the members of the Republican Party to use the same flag. Some suggested this design, some had others. Sung Chiao Jen gained the majority support for his flag ; but it was objected that the only flag actually in existence was the Revolutionary flag (a dark crimson, with one dark blue quarter in the middle of which is the sun, in white—the quarter being also the special flag of Dr. Sun Yat-sen).

In answer to this, Sung Chiao Jen went to the bedroom of a friend where he had the flags stored, and returned with them.

Sung Chiao Jen was a very powerful personality in the early days of

But at that time Yuan Shih-kai was a sycophant of the Powers. His aim was to establish his autocracy and break his opponents. (Hence, he was a favourite of the English.)

Therefore, Yuan Shih-kai agreed with England at the end of January 1913, to make a formal exchange of documents.

On November 13 took place the Anglo-Chinese Conference on Thibetan Problems ; and on April 27 of the following year (1914) the protocols were signed by both sides and documents exchanged.

When England treated the Thibetan problem in this fashion, Russia followed suit in Mongolia.

In September 1912 the Russian Minister at Peking went to Urga to hold a conference with the Mongolian princes ; and the Russo-Mongolian Treaty resulted, in November :—

(i) Russia, with a view to maintaining sovereignty in Mongolia, and enabling Mongolia to resist Chinese troops, agreed to afford military assistance.

(ii) The Mongolian Government granted Russia the Republic. He was a tactful and adroit patriot, more feared by Yuan Shih-kai than was Dr. Sun.

He drew up the constitution of the Kuomintang Party, and was chosen as Premier by the Constitutional Party—before it had been driven out with foreign help—to fight Yuan Shih-kai's unconstitutional despotism in Peking (see Introduction).

He was assassinated by an agent of Yuan Shih-kai in the spring of 1913, on his way to Peking, whether Yuan decoyed him by an offer of the premiership. The assassin afterwards confessed that he had committed this crime for £200, while further investigation has shown that this sum represented one-tenth of the sum paid by Yuan to the assassin's employer, one of his cabinet ministers.

This act of tyranny immediately preceded Yuan Shih-kai's suppression of the Republican Parliament and bloody suppression of the Constitutionalists by means of the 'Reorganization Loan' supplied for this purpose by the foreign 'Consortium'

commercial and other privileges and particular rights. The rules and regulations necessary to these privileges were added in an appendix.

(iii) It was provided that, should the Mongolian Government come under the necessity of contracting treaties with China, or any other country, such treaties should not affect the present agreement or the regulations in the appendix, without Russia's specific sanction.

Yuan Shih-kai, having behaved as described above in his negotiations with England regarding Thibet, had to treat the Russo-Mongolian negotiation in the same fashion.

Therefore the Russo-Chinese Agreement was announced on November 5, 1913.

In September 1914 China, Russia, and Mongolia sent delegates to the conference at Kiachta.

On June 7, 1915, the Chinese, Russian, and Mongolian Agreement, with twenty-two articles, was signed.

We have to add that, after 1916, Russia was too exhausted, by her war with Germany, to follow up her policy in Mongolia ; and, after 1917, the Revolution completely changed Russian foreign policy.¹

Conclusion : We can see, then, that the Powers did not, during the Investment Period, abandon the desire of quartering the Chinese melon.

But for the sudden Great European War, which broke out in August 1914, the Chinese situation would have been very different from what it is to-day.

¹ For this reason the terms of this treaty do not need specification.

THE FOURTH PERIOD

FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE EUROPEAN WAR
TO THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE

The Great European War began in the autumn of 1914, and ended in the winter of 1918. At its beginning only the allied forces of the Central Powers opposed the Entente—England, France, Russia, and the others. Afterwards both protagonists endeavoured to involve the other countries, by persuasion and threats. The result was a great World War.

Japan's Opportunity in the Great War.

During the Great War the European nations had not time even to save themselves from destruction, let alone sparing time and energy for China.

Japan dined alone.

Not only the militarists and politicians clenched their fists and rubbed their muscles, with mouths watering over their waistcoats ; the literary men, the scholars, took up the continuous cry, ‘Quick ! Seize the opportunity ! This is the chance of a thousand years.’

Japan could not resist the opportunity. Let us study the sequel.

1. *Japan's First Step.*

First, Japan declared war on Germany and violated China's neutrality. It would have been the wise

policy for the Chinese Government, at the outset of the European War, to endeavour immediately to open negotiations with Germany for the recovery of the concessions around Kiaochowan ; and, failing in negotiation, to use force. But Yuan Shih-kai was at that time the cuckoo in the nest ; he lacked the foresight and the courage.

Therefore, on August 23, Japan declared war ; her object being to seize the Kiaochowan concessions and take over all the German privileges in Shantung.

We must remember that since the Russo-Japanese War, Japan had taken her stand on the Russo-Japanese Treaty, signed in September 1905. By this treaty Russia had to renounce her 'sphere of influence' in Korea, and to give up her concessions in Lushun, Darenwan [the Gulf of Daren], and her constructional and administrative rights over the railway from Chansuen to Lushun : China's agreement always provided.

In December Japan contracted with China her Peking Treaty, in which the above arrangements were ratified, and Korea recognised as a Japanese Protectorate.¹

Within but a few years Japan openly annexed Korea, and exercised unquestioned domination both in Northern and in Eastern China.

Now, during the Great War, Japan took a step forward. She seized the German concessions and enterprises around Kiaochowan, and took over all

¹ Any reader interested in Far Eastern politics may find a fascinating study of the Japanese idea of Protectorates, in *The Case of Korea* by H. Chung, published by George Allen and Unwin.

Germany's rights in Shantung. In consequence, Japan's influence in China penetrated not only the North-Eastern territories, but the heart of the country.

Japan's declaration of war on Germany was in fact a declaration of war on China. Her motives are obvious.

Take the following instances :

Weihsien, in Shantung, was outside the war-zone. But Japan purposely despatched troops thither on September 25, 1924, and seized the railway station. The troops then marched along the Kiaochow-Tsinan Railway, occupying the stations. On Oct. 6 Japanese soldiers even occupied the railway station at Tsinan,¹ while others were sent to disturb the vicinity of the capital.

This conduct of the Japanese compared ill with the past conduct of the Germans, who, during their pioneer work on the Kiaochow-Tsinan line, never stationed troops along it. But the Japanese, taking such military occupation actually as a pretext, penetrated the capital city of Shantung.

The Chinese Government, as usual, held its breath and bore patiently this barbarism.

Thereupon, the Japanese went further and made the Twenty-one Demands.

2. *Japan's Twenty-one Demands.*

The Negotiation. On January 18, 1915, the Japanese Minister to Peking, Mr. Hioki Eki, paid a

¹ The Capital City of the Shantung Province.

personal visit to Yuan Shih-kai, bringing the Twenty-one Demands.

The Japanese Minister said to Yuan Shih-kai, 'The Japanese Government, and all classes of our people, regard you, Most Noble Mr. President, as being anti-Japanese : therefore they hold you in constant suspicion. But if you, Most Noble Mr. President, can agree to these demands, Japan most sincerely expects that you, Most Noble Mr. President, will be promoted.'

Yuan Shih-kai heard the word 'promotion,' and understood it. In the light of this tacit understanding, discussions were held for several months.

It was on May 7 that Japan sent her ultimatum. On the ninth Yuan Shih-kai consented to sign.¹

The Terms. The contents of the Twenty-one Demands were classified in five groups :

(i) The First Group, concerning the Shantung Province, contained four Articles.

(ii) The Second Group, concerning South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, contained seven Articles.

(iii) The Third Group, concerning the Haiyang Pingshan coal and iron industries, contained two Articles.

(iv) The Fourth Group, concerning the gulfs, harbours, and inland groups of the China coast, contained one Article.

¹ Note that the presentation of the demands to the President was in itself against diplomatic usage. The note should have been presented to the Secretary for Foreign Affairs.

(v) The Fifth Group, regarding certain general matters, contained seven Articles.

I give herewith the original text.¹

(i) *First Group.*

The Japanese and Chinese Governments are mutually willing to maintain peace in all parts of East Asia, and also expect to further the present friendly relationships of their countries.

The items are herewith drafted as follows.

First Item : The Chinese Government promises to recognise that hereafter the Japanese Government shall come to an agreement with the German Government, whereby it shall take over from the Germans all their privileges, advantages, and concessions in Shantung, whether these be, or be not, based on treaties with the Chinese Government.

Second Item : The Chinese Government promises that none of the coast lands and groups of islands belonging to the Shantung Province shall, under any terms, be ceded or conceded to any other nation.

Third Item : The Chinese Government consents to the construction by Japan of a railway from Yintai or Lungkow, to be connected with the main line of the Kiaochow-Tsinan Railway.

Fourth Item : The Chinese Government undertakes to open immediately, on the initiative of China, all important cities of Shantung for foreign residence and trade in China, to be trading centres.

¹ The version is of the Chinese text.

With regard to the places so opened, special agreements will be made.

(ii) *Second Group.*

The Japanese and Chinese Governments, in accordance with China's accepted acknowledgment of the superior position occupied by Japan in Southern Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, hereby agree to the following items.

First Item : The two contracting parties mutually agree that the period of the concession of Lushun and Daren, together with the South Manchurian Railway and the Anfung Railway, be extended to ninety-nine years.

Second Item : Japanese officials and subjects in Southern Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia shall obtain such land concessions or rights of tenure as may be necessary for the erection of buildings and factories, and for commerce, industry, and agriculture.

Third Item : Japanese officials and subjects shall be able to reside, travel, and carry on commercial and industrial business, without restriction, in Southern Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia.

Fourth Item : The Chinese Government undertakes to grant to Japanese officials and subjects the privilege of opening up the mines in Southern Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia.

In regard to mines so opened up, special agreements shall be made.

Fifth Item : The Chinese Government must promise first to obtain the consent of the Japanese Government before any action in regard to

- (a) allowing other nations to build railways in Southern Manchuria or/and Eastern Inner Mongolia, or obtaining foreign loans for railway construction ;
- (b) obtaining foreign loans secured on the taxes of Southern Manchuria and/or Eastern Inner Mongolia.

Sixth Item : The Chinese Government undertakes the obligation of consulting with the Japanese Government, if the Chinese Government desires at any time to employ political, financial, or military advisers or instructors in Southern Manchuria and/or Eastern Inner Mongolia.

Seventh Item : The Chinese Government undertakes to entrust the administration of the Kirin and Changchun Railway, and its entire development, to the Japanese Government for a period of ninety-nine years, to commence from the date on which this treaty is signed.¹

(iii) *Third Group.*

The Japanese and Chinese Governments desire to further the present intimate relationships between the Japanese capitalists and the Hanyangtye and Pinshan coal and iron industries, in order to promote the mutual interests of Japan and China. Herewith the terms are as follows.

¹ i.e. May 7, 1915, to May 7, 2014.

First Item : The two contracting countries mutually agree that in future, whenever suitable opportunity arises, the Hanyangtye and Pinshan Development Company shall be controlled and managed by the two countries in co-operation.

The Chinese Government undertakes that no rights or premises now belonging to that Company shall be disposed of by the Chinese Government, nor by the Company itself at will, without the consent of the Japanese Government.

Second Item : The Chinese Government undertakes that no mines in the area under development by the Hanyangtye and Pinshan Company shall be leased for working by other companies without the consent of the Hanyangtye and Pinshan Company ; and that, in addition, any other enterprises either directly or indirectly affecting the Hanyangtye and Pinshan Company shall be undertaken subject to the consent of that company.

Fourth Group.

The Japanese and Chinese Governments, with the purpose of achieving China's integrity of territory, agree to the following draft.

Item : The Chinese Government undertakes that no harbour, gulf, or group of islands along the Chinese coast shall be ceded or conceded to any other nation.

Fifth Group.

First Item : In the Central Government of China influential Japanese shall be invited as political, financial, and military advisers.

Second Item : All Japanese hospitals, monasteries, and schools in the interior of China shall be given the right to possess land.

Third Item : Certain amounts of ammunition shall be bought from Japan:¹ or China shall establish Sino-Japanese ammunition works, employing Japanese experts and buying Japanese materials.

Fourth Item : There have in the past occurred troubles between Japan and China in the matter of police. From these troubles many complications have developed.

Therefore, the police in all important centres shall be under Sino-Japanese control. All the police stations in such places must employ a majority of Japanese, in order to concert measures for the reform of the Chinese Police system.

Fifth Item : The Chinese Government undertakes that the construction privileges of the railways connecting with the Wuchang-Kukiang-Nanchang Line, as well as the Nanchang-Hanchow Line, and the Nanchang-Chaochow Line, shall be given over to Japan.

Sixth Item : In developing the railways, minings, and harbours (including the docks) within the Fukien Province, when foreign capital is required, China must first consult Japan.

¹ Japanese ammunition. Vast quantities of this were useless. The Japanese have supplied millions of cartridges, for instance, with cardboard bullets and common Chinese cracker-powder as the explosive force. I have some specimens in my possession.

Seventh Item : The Chinese Government undertakes that the Japanese shall have the right of religious propaganda in China.¹

Note on the Twenty-one Demands.

The Five Groups, then, include twenty-one items.

Despite some slight modification, as the result of discussion back and forth, the whole was established.

The most hateful feature of this agreement is that the most important items of all were not openly promised by us in this treaty, but secured by stipulations appended in the notes. The sixth item of the Second Group, and the whole of the Third Group, were all drafted in such appendices.

Every item in the Fifth Group, except that regarding the Fukien Province [the Sixth], which was recognised after modification, were, according to Japan's announcement after the ultimatum was sent, to be separated from the present negotiation for future discussion.

Everybody must know that China, by recognising the items of the Fifth Group, would be sealing her political annihilation. But, taking only the items then recognised :

To Shantung, it was good-bye.

¹ Those readers whose interest has been aroused by this document, with regard to past Japanese policy in China, and with reference to world politics, may be referred to *The Truth about China and Japan*, by Putnam Weale (a writer possessing excellent grasp, for a European, of the facts of modern Chinese history, and *The New Japanese Peril*, by Sidney Osborne, and Millard's *Democracy and the Far-Eastern Question*.

To Southern Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, it was good-bye.

To the Hanyangte and Pinshan Company, it was good-bye.

All the harbours, gulf, and groups of islands along the coasts of China, in common with the coasts and coastal islands of the Shantung Province, were provided for in the one phrase : ‘None of these may be ceded or conceded to any other country.’

By examining the 1898 Treaty, by which all the Powers determined their sphere of influence, we know the meaning of this ‘non-alienation’ clause. To *all* the coastal harbours, gulf, and groups of islands of the whole of China, it was good-bye.

Illegality of the Agreement.

Such a treaty, the assassination of our national life, was glibly given, in exchange for an ultimatum on a slip of Japanese paper.¹ The Sino-Japanese War of 1894 had been fought for nothing.

But this treaty, such as it is, has never been recognised by China or the Chinese people.

It was the outcome of a private deal between Yuan Shih-kai and Japan. From a legal point of view, it has never been passed by parliament, and therefore cannot be enforced ; from the practical point of view, Yuan Shih-kai had at this time already become a criminal traitor to the Chinese Republic, and had no claim to represent the people, who at

¹ The ‘slip of Japanese paper,’ it may interest the reader to know, was watermarked all over with pictures of dreadnaughts and machine-guns.

that time regarded Japan with an universal and bitter hatred.

Instance the Chiu-kwo-chu-kin-twan [Chinese Patriotic Savings Organisation]¹ and the economic boycott against Japan, as expressing the spirit of the Chinese people.

I can confidently state that neither China nor the Chinese people has ever, from start to finish, recognised these Twenty-one Demands.

3. Japanese Loans and Military Agreements.

As the result of the private give-and-take between Japan and Yuan Shih-kai, Japan secured her twenty-one items ; and, as a matter of course, Yuan Shih-kai did get his promotion. In the fifth year of the Chinese Republic [1915] he continued in power as President. But in the first year of Hung Shien he suddenly died. He was the victim of his promotion.²

¹ This society was an open organisation formed for the purpose of resisting the Japanese policy by all possible means. There was much dishonesty among the initiators of this movement, who were eager to exploit the situation. The honest organisers were not the cleverest. Nevertheless, the propaganda published undoubtedly expressed the universal feeling, and the economic boycott here mentioned was largely the result of the political campaign inaugurated by this society.

² ‘The first year of Hung Shien . . . promotion.’

The irony of this passage, apparent to a Chinese, is lost until we realise that Hung Shien was the name adopted by Yuan Shih-kai (now ‘promoted’ Emperor) for the period of his ‘reign,’ according to the custom of the Chinese Emperors, each of whom thus named his epoch.

He was ‘the victim of his promotion’ because his ‘restoration of the Monarchy’ led to the final loss of his prestige and remaining power in China. The provinces revolted; and, in a fit of cholera, Yuan Shih-kai died.

The story is a comment on the wisdom of those Europeans who still delude themselves that the Chinese people would be willing to abandon the Republic.

After this Japan, in a palsy of excitement, was driven to every expedient in her attempt to maintain her twenty-one points.

What were these expedients ?

Japan's Political Methods. In general, Japan had two methods of dealing ;¹ one for the Powers, the other for China.

(a) What is Japan's method in dealing with the Powers ?

On July 3, 1916, Japan contracted a new agreement with Russia, to the following effect :

(1) Japan should not join in any political agreement or grouping directed against Russia by her enemies. Neither should Russia join in any agreement or grouping directed against Japan.

(2) If either of the contracting parties should have its territorial rights or/and special advantages menaced by any country² which had previously recognised such privileges and special advantages, then Japan and Russia should co-operate in devising and applying suitable methods for mutual assistance and for the protection of these rights and privileges.

This is daylight robbery.

At the same time there was a secret agreement between Japan and Russia, recognising that if China should resist the influence of any third nation hostile to Japan or/and Russia, they should co-operate in assisting China ; while, should any third nation take

¹ A brilliant exposition of this statement is given by Mr. Putnam Weale in *The Fight for the Republic in China* (Chapter V. and also Chapters XV. and XVI.).

² The 'country' meant is, of course, China.

action against Japan and/or Russia, the two should unite in war and act together in the subsequent treaty.

This new agreement, and the secret treaty, expressed the acknowledged purpose of Japan and Russia ; to protect the privileges and rights in China which they had obtained, at the same time strengthening themselves in co-operation to resist the jealous action of a third nation. China did not count.

We come now to China's entry into the war.

Not until after February 1917 did a group of Chinese propose to follow the lead of the United States, in declaring the severance of relationships with Germany. This movement ended in the declaration of war.

Complicated as were the motives of this action, the reasonable explanation seems to be China's desire for help from the United States against Japan. Indeed, a futile idea. A drowning man might as well clutch a stalk of seaweed for a lifebelt. But, in Japanese eyes, it constituted a grave revolt.

Japan, therefore, requested England to agree in recognising her rights in Shantung ; in exchange Japan would allow China to join in the war.

England was thirstily looking to China's participation. Her answer was swift : 'The Japanese Government requests the British Government to uphold Japan's demands at the future peace conference, and to protect Japan in regard to the treatment she shall receive in the matter of the German

rights in Shantung, as also concerning the island territories north of the Equator. The British Government heartily consents.'

Having obtained England's consent, Japan asked France, Russia, and Italy in turn, for the same promise of protection.

Russia, of course, agreed. France and Italy, seeing that England and Russia had already consented, consented also. In May of the same year, all the documents were formally exchanged.

Japan's attitude thereupon altered. Instead of preventing, she assented to China's participation in the war.

The cunning and adroitness of Japan's methods surprised the world.

(b) Thus did Japan deal with the Powers.

How did she deal with China?

Ever since the Twenty-one Demands the Chinese people has never ceased, by day or night, from mourning by the coffin of its national honour.

Japan has clearly understood this. Clearly too did Japan understand the motive of a Chinese group in proposing to join the war. Therefore she regarded China as a dying snake. No need for a death-blow. Revival was impossible. Nevertheless, having arranged with the Entente Powers for their co-operative protection to her treatment of Shantung, she prepared a death-blow for China.

At the beginning Japan had given a hint to the Chinese Government, saying that the severance of relations with Germany, and the declaration of war,

must be ‘carefully considered’; also that China must get her consent.

Japan could not have said more plainly, ‘If you wish to join in the war you must ask me for loans and munitions.’ Indeed.

However, Japan was satisfied by the proposal of a group of Chinese,¹ ‘Abroad, declaration without war; at home, war without declaration.’² And that group which had been sincere in its proposal to join in the war, not only failed, but got the contrary of what they had planned. China’s joining the war, far from securing American aid against Japan, assisted Japanese encroachment in China.

Loans and military agreements were contracted one after another.

‘Your trap to catch you : your spear against your shield.’ That was Japan’s device. China fell to it.

Pitiful.

Regarding the Loans. From her time of entry into the war until its end, did China send one soldier to Europe?

Yet, besides the War Loan, amounting to twenty million dollars, floated in July 1918, there were loans for four lines of railways in Manchuria and Mongolia ; and two railways in Shantung were started in September of the same year.

¹ The notorious Anfu group of Chinese statesmen, suborned by the Japanese Imperialists.

² This phrase means : ‘Declare war ; contract loans from Japan ; purchase Japanese ammunition . Then use the money and ammunition at home, to subdue the Chinese Nationalist Party, and settle yourselves firmly in the saddle where we can continue to profit by selling our Country.’

The so-called 'Four Lines of Railways in Mongolia and Manchuria are :

- (a) Between Kaiynen, Hailung, and Kirin.
- (b) Between Changtsuen and Yaonan.
- (c) Between Yaonan and Jehol.
- (d) From a point between Yaonan and Jehol to the sea.

The total length of these four is one thousand li (about 350 miles). For this purpose a loan of twenty million dollars was floated.

The so-called 'Two Railways in Shantung' are :

- (a) Between Tsinan and Shenteh.
- (b) Between Kaomi and Suichow.

A total length of over four hundred li. For these, another loan of twenty million dollars was floated.

In addition were munition loans, and lesser loans beyond our scope to describe.

Regarding the Military Agreements. From China's entry into the war until the Armistice, did Germany ever send one soldier to attack China ?

Yet, in May 1918, military agreements concerning our army and navy were contracted one after another.

At the time they were kept secret, and announced only in March 1919.

Whether the original secret documents were those now in our possession, we do not know. From these, it appears that China's pretext, in declaring war, was her object of preventing the penetration of China by German influence through Russia.

At this time, of course, Germany was exhausted

with war. Where was her surplus energy for an expedition to the Far East?

It is not worth a smile.

The agreements went so far as to allow Japanese troops to be stationed in Chinese territory.

Stipulations were added regarding provisions for mutual defence, which required that Japan and China should 'mutually supply munitions, supplies, and raw material.'

'Mutually.' The word was ridiculous; for in truth the Fifth Group¹ of the Twenty-one Demands—the items which, at the time of the ultimatum, were 'deferred for further discussion'—now took effect.

Japan had succeeded both in destroying the original objective with which China entered the war, and also in initiating the Chinese Civil War.

This new method of domination was really a wonderful invention of the Japanese militarists and politicians.

Had there not been another half of China in the South West, which courageously and patiently struggled against the actions of Japanese encroachment, China's life must have been struck low by the Japanese poleaxe.

Japan and the Paris Peace Conference.

Japan's independent action with regard to encroachment in China began, then, with the European War.

¹ See above, pp. 81 and 82.

The fifth is the last and 'miscellaneous' group, whose items amount to the complete slavery of China to Japanese militarism.

The end of that war logically and naturally set the term to it.

In November 1918 the European War was brought to a close, pending the opening of the Paris Peace Conference.

The people of China, long depressed by Japanese penetration, saw here an opportunity to find salvation from danger. So, throughout China, spirited and thinking men fixed their eyes on the Paris Peace Conference. Especially they watched the Chinese group of plenipotentiaries. What would be their action ?

China's Proposals and the Response of the Powers.

First, China took her stand on the fact that she was a member of the Entente.

She proposed the recovery of all the privileges and advantages formerly taken by Germany in Shantung, and of the concessions around Kiaochow.

This proposal, though seemingly aimed at Germany, was in reality aimed against Japan. Therefore the Chinese delegates enumerated the measures by which Japan, when she declared war on Germany, had violated Chinese neutrality ; Japan's violent action along the Kiaochow-Tsinan Railway ; and the forced signing of the Twenty-one Demands.

China hoped, in these matters, to gain the sympathy of the Powers.

Second, taking her stand on justice and humanity, China, in hopeful expectation, introduced certain proposals to the Powers. These were :

- (a) The abolition of spheres of influence.

- (b) The withdrawal from China of foreign troops and police.
- (c) Withdrawal of foreign control from the Postal Service, Telegraphs, and Wireless.
- (d) Abolition of extraterritorial rights.
- (e) Return to China of the concessions and foreign settlements.
- (f) The granting of tariff autonomy.

All these were matters of life and death to our nation. But the Chinese delegates expressed their hopes. That was all. A pitiable scene.

The language employed was cautiously moderate, that there might be no suspicion of ungentlemanly behaviour.

How did the Paris Peace Conference meet China's proposals? What did they decide?

First, the Peace Treaty with Germany (Articles Nos. 156 and 258) clearly stipulated that Germany's rights, under the Sino-German Treaty of March 6, 1898—embodying all the agreements affecting the Shantung Province and all the privileges and special rights—should be given over to Japan.

The properties of the German State in Kiaochow, together with all Germany's pioneer and reconstructive undertakings, directly or indirectly accomplished by her—together with the money raised for the development of all her special privileges—were hereby to become Japanese property, to be retained without compensation.

Within three months of the signing of this treaty Germany must hand over to Japan, not only the

civil, military, and financial control, together with the machinery of jurisdiction in the Kiaochow area, but also all registered accounts, records, maps, certificates, and all other documents.

Second, over the name of the Chairman of the Peace Conference, the French Premier, Clemenceau, a letter was written and handed over to the Chinese group of plenipotentiaries. This letter dealt with China's hopes in these words :

' This Conference sufficiently recognises the importance of this problem, but cannot regard it as coming within the scope of this Peace Conference.

' The matter must wait until the political administration department of the League of Nations is able to fulfil its rights and duties. To their attention it shall be submitted.'

Such was the result achieved by China's participation in the Paris Peace Conference of May 1919.

Reasons for China's Failure at the Paris Peace Conference.

For this failure there are several reasons.

(i) First, as regards the European Powers :

During the European War, the Entente Governments championed justice and humanity. This was a pretence, to blind men's eyes and deafen their ears.

I know that among the people, in all countries, many were true champions of justice and humanity. But of justice and humanity all the governments were enemies. Their object, with regard to internal politics, was so to exploit the glories of victory as to

force their peoples back to the old corrupt system. In foreign politics, each government hoped to exploit the imperialism of one nation for destroying that of another, in order itself to take over the prize.

In such a mental atmosphere, how could China's hopes be fulfilled?

In the matter of Sino-Japanese relations, how could the Powers, possessed by such materialism, offend a powerful nation for the sake of a weak one? Even without the Japanese agreements of May 1917, with England, France, and Italy, concerning Shantung, the Powers must still have decided for Japan.

(ii) Second, with regard to the United States :

When Wilson declared his Fourteen Points, the small and weak peoples raised their heads and took a deep breath of hope.

But after reaching Paris, Wilson's association with the plenipotentiaries of the Great Powers was too much for him. He lost his head. He forgot every one of his Fourteen Points. The weak and small peoples were abandoned. China, naturally, was abandoned also : her proposals, her hopes, forgotten.

His ideas with regard to Japan, however, Wilson remembered, because of the clash between Japan and the United States.

Therefore, immediately on his arrival, he consulted Clemenceau, propounding the view that, the Germany of the West having been defeated, it was imperative to defeat the Germany of the East.

Clemenceau replied that France had exhausted

her energy. She must rest. She must impose permanent bondage on Germany. She had no other concern.

Wilson's head had struck a cold nail.

Wilson next went to consult Lloyd George, the British Prime Minister.

Lloyd George expressed the most sympathetic agreement. The spirits of Wilson rose to ecstasy.

But Lloyd George was only exploiting his chance of making Wilson happy, so as to secure for England the support of the United States. This achieved, other problems would find easy solution.

Meantime, Japan, England, France and Italy contracted a secret treaty concerning the future of the Shantung Province.

Wilson was still in dreamland.

When he did wake up, he pretended to be blind to the situation. He is even said to have advised the Chinese Plenipotentiaries to sign the Peace Treaty, as being beneficial to China.

(iii) Third, as regards Japan :

Japan knew that the excess privileges, which she had gained from China during the European War, must rouse the jealousy of the Powers.

But the Powers had all they could do to arrange for Germany, Austria, and Turkey. They had no time to settle with Japan. Moreover, England, France and Italy had already consented to the scheme for Shantung ; and, strong in this fact, Japan had only the United States to deal with. This was easy.

(iv) Fourth, as regards China :

'Abroad, declaration without war ; at home, war without declaration,' had naturally produced some coldness in the Peace Conference.

Moreover, though the Twenty-one Demands had been signed under duress, nevertheless the documents, relating to the Four Railway Lines in Manchuria and Mongolia and the Two Railways in Shantung, had been exchanged.

Despite the cordial expressions of agreement which were phrased at the Conference, China suffered, as the result of this treaty, not merely coldness of manner but insult.

Such were the causes of China's failure in the Paris Conference.

China's Signature Withheld.

Our only help at that time was the Students' Movement, started in Peking on May 4, 1919, and carried on throughout the country, demanding a clean sweep of traitors at home and the protection of China's sovereignty abroad.

These objects were afterwards crystallised in the watch-words : 'Down with the Militarists,'¹ 'Down

¹ By 'Militarists' are meant, not foreigners, but the Chinese 'War-lords,' whose interest lies in the preservation of a military anarchy resembling the worst days of European Medievalism, and whose constant aim, backed by the Imperialist diplomacy of the Powers, is to prevent the setting up of a constitutional Republican Government in Peking. Such a government, with its demands for an integral China [see last chapter of this Draft], will be as fatal to these Militarists as to the Imperialistic policy of penetration.

The whole is well summed up, therefore, in the two watch-words. [Compare also Introduction, page xiii.]

with the Imperialists'; the purpose being to open a road for the People's Revolution.

When the Peace Treaty with Germany was presented for signature, the Chinese plenipotentiaries, seeing the anger of the students in China, and of those resident in Paris, obeyed the people's will and refused to sign.

In my opinion, China's attitude of passive resistance to the Imperialists, maintained from the Opium War to the Paris Conference, has been deserving of praise.

5. *The 'New Consortium' and Japan.*

Another important Conference was held in Paris contemporaneous with the Paris Peace Conference.

This was the discussion, by representatives of the banking concerns of the Powers, concerning the method of making loans to China.

From this dated the establishment of the 'New Consortium.'

Formerly the United States, in 1913, had withdrawn from the Consortium of Six Powers.

After 1914 England, Russia, Germany and France had no surplus energy. Japan, acting singly, made loans to China. In August 1917 was signed the first agreement, for a loan of ten million dollars; in January 1918 the second agreement, for a further loan of ten million dollars.

Seeing Japan exercising so free a hand, the United States, in October 1918, felt bound to initiate a new

Consortium of Four Powers—the United States, Japan, England and France.

At this time the United States was financially supreme. England and France, in their desire for supplies of money from the United States, had to follow the lead.

The Japanese understood the situation thoroughly. Therefore, in May 1919, after the Bankers' Conference in Paris, the Japanese bankers' representatives proposed to the Bankers' representatives of the United States, that Manchuria and Mongolia should be excluded from the operations of the New Consortium.

In other words, Manchuria and Mongolia, where Japan enjoyed special advantages, were to be set aside for her particular feast.

The United States, of course, did not yield. Up to May 1920, the Japanese bankers' representatives kept proposing to the United States bankers' representatives that their proposal, of June, for the segregation of Manchuria and Mongolia, should be withdrawn so as to allow Japan to join the New Consortium unconditionally. And finally, in October 1920, the representatives of the bankers of the Four Powers held a conference in New York, and decided the regulations to govern the New Consortium.

These negotiations deeply distressed Japan : such was the change after her complete freedom of action during the European War. But in the end she yielded little. Let us review the decisions :

- (i) The Railway in Southern Manchuria, with its

branch lines, as well as its subordinate enterprises (mines, etc.), should be outside the sphere of influence of the Four Powers' Consortium.

(ii) The Railway from Yaonan to Jehol, as well as its branch line to the coast and the harbours (as mentioned above), should be included in the agreement of the Four Powers' Consortium.

(iii) The lines connecting Kirin with Hwaining ; Changkiatwen with Yaonan ; Kaiyuensheng with Hwaitung and Kirin ; Kirin with Changchuen ; Shingmingtuen with Mukden ; Shipingai with Changkiatwen—all these were to be outside the sphere of operations of the New Consortium.

Japan's only loss here is comprised in the second item. That was all. There was no attempt to enforce the resolution passed in Paris in May 1919, by England, the United States, and France, to the effect that, ' All enterprises [in China], particularly the railway interests, must be recognised as being inseparable from our mutual interests and cannot be separately dealt with.'

When we consider carefully the history of how this New Consortium was established, we cannot fail to perceive what were the motives of the United States, England and France, in this continued exploitation and investment. Nor is it hard to see Japan's motive in obtaining Manchuria and Mongolia for herself.

THE FIFTH PERIOD
FROM THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE TO THE
PRESENT DAY [APRIL 1925].

i. *The Truth about the Washington Conference.*

As mentioned above, the Powers, during the European War, as well as before and after the Paris Peace Conference, were all unable to control Japan's actions of independent encroachment in China. Yet they could not disregard them.

The Imperialistic countries, which would not take action for the sake of humanity and justice, had to act when their own interests were involved.

Therefore, in November 1921, the United States Government initiated the so-called Washington Conference. Other countries which joined in this conference were Belgium, England, France, Italy, Japan, Holland, Portugal and China.

The discussions and resolutions in this conference did not even approach a solution of the Chinese problem, though Chinese affairs were its most important subject.

It was announced that the Senate of the United States, refusing to sign the Peace Treaty of the Paris Peace Conference, therefore opened this Washington Conference with the object of helping China.

This statement was false.

This Conference was not inspired nor motivated

by Humanity and Justice, but by the self-interest of all concerned. Its aim was not help for China, but restraint on the Japanese—who, during the European War, had developed independently their encroachment policy—and a general return to the slow method of encroachment, as practised before the War. During the War all the Powers had learnt many lessons ; they realised now the necessity of avoiding further conflict, by close co-operation. The Conference, therefore, resulted in the initiation of such a co-operative system being applied to economic encroachment in China.

What is the proof of this ? It is in the result of the Conference.

The Betrayal of China to Japan.

China had hoped and expected to gain from the Washington Conference what the Paris Peace Conference had denied her. Ever since the Paris Peace Conference, she had firmly insisted that 'direct negotiations between China and Japan should be opposed.'

The Washington Conference forced her to abandon her insistence on this principle.

The decision of the Conference was adorned by a phrase : 'England, the United States, and the other nations would act as go-betweens.' But neither Japan nor China had any alternative but to adopt the policy dictated.

Now Japan, in a note transmitted with the Twenty-one Demands, had already informed the Chinese

Government of the return to China of the concessions around Kiaochowan ; which, though temporarily occupying, she had no right to retain.

The original language of this note was as follows : ‘ The concessions around Kiaochowan shall, at the close of the present war, be entrusted entirely to the Japanese Government, to deal with at its discretion ; but, on acceptance of the following terms, these concessions shall be returned to China.’ (Then followed the Twenty-one Demands.) ’

China did not recognise the Twenty-one Demands, nor did she acknowledge the Note. As a full member of the Entente, she proposed to recover the concessions around Kiaochowan directly from Germany, at the Paris Peace Conference.

But now, by the Washington decision, China was forced to negotiate directly with Japan ; thereby recognising that Japan, according to the Versailles Treaty, had already obtained the rights from Germany, and that their recovery must be from her.

Not only did this decision override the motive for China’s original refusal to sign the Versailles Treaty ; it also rendered somewhat difficult to understand the American Senate’s refusal to sanction that treaty.

Moreover, her acquisition of the German privileges, by the Versailles Treaty, satisfied Japan. In January 1920 she sent to the Chinese Government an official note to the effect that, since the Twenty-one Demands had been secured by the Versailles Treaty, the note originally transmitted with those demands, concerning the return by Japan of the

Kiaochowan concessions, should be China's compensation for the enforcement of the Twenty-one Demands. Japan further demanded direct negotiation with China.

Now, should China recognise this principle of direct negotiation, she would, by so doing, recognise not only the Versailles Treaty, but also the Note and the Twenty-one Demands.

So we see the Japanese representative, in the Far Eastern Committee of the Washington Conference, joyfully stating that 'Any nation must exercise great care in the surrender of its sovereignty or of important rights. But, once such sovereignty or rights are surrendered by treaty, there shall be no case for restoration. Therefore, the Twenty-one Demands must be enforced for ever.'

How plainly does his tone express Japan's satisfaction and China's deep despair !

In this particular negotiation China did obtain a slight advantage from the clear interpretation of the Twenty-one Demands, and also from the further definition of the terms and conditions regarding the return of the Kiaochowan concessions. But the recognition of the Versailles Treaty, which had been rejected by the whole Chinese people—and especially the recognition of the Twenty-one Demands, which made our heads and hearts ache, and was regarded as a national humiliation—constituted a shameful and colossal disaster.

Why did the other nations coerce China in this manner ? Because their only idea, from the start,

had been to force Japan to vomit up the privileges she had swallowed ; to mitigate their own jealousy, and to appease Japan's disappointment.

Humanity, justice, aid to China—these were never considered. Such, and no more, was the result of the Washington Conference, in regard to the Sino-Japanese negotiations.

China's Demands at the Washington Conference.

The responsibility for meeting China's expectations had been shifted from the Paris Peace Conference to the League of Nations.

At the Washington Conference China's proposals were slightly discussed.

The possibility of the abolition of 'Spheres of Influence' was regarded as a thing of the past.

The question of withdrawing foreign military and police forces, the foreign ministers at Peking were authorised to settle : with the reservation that all the nations concerned should retain the right of recognising or refusing the decisions.

In regard to the withdrawal of the foreign telegraphic and postal control, the Conference agreed only to withdraw the foreign stations. But stations in the concessions, and those especially authorised by treaty, were to be retained.

Despite the partial compensation, China was bitterly disappointed ; especially by the entire shelving of the questions in regard to the return of the settlements and concessions, the abolition of extraterritorial rights, and the granting of

tariff autonomy ; questions of life or death to China.

China found it impossible even to propose the return of the concessions. With regard to the leased lands, Japan stated definitely that the return to China of Kiaochow had already been decided ; but that, as to Lushun and Talienwan, China had best not dream of their recovery.

England, while admitting the possibility of Weihaiwei being restored, also stated frankly that China had best not dream of the restoration of Kowloon. (The restoration of Weihaiwei, of course, never materialised.)

The question of the return by France of Kwan-chow was allowed to remain a confused issue.

The question of the abolition of extraterritorial rights was shifted to a Commission, to be organised by the Powers, for the making of a thorough investigation, preliminary to deciding on the adoption of a gradual method, or a method of some kind or other.

The Chinese delegation requested the representatives of the other nations attending the Conference to settle a date for the abolition of the extraterritorial rights ; but their request bore no fruit.

The vague language used in this matter resembled that which we may see in the twelfth article of the Sino-British Treaty of 1902 (the fifth day of the ninth month).¹

¹ September 5, 1902. The British Commissioner for Negotiation was Sir James L. Mackay, afterwards Lord Inchcape. (China, 1902, No. 2) Article xii :—

“ China having expressed a strong desire to reform her judicial

The treatment of the tariff autonomy question was absurd.

The Chinese delegation announced, as one of their proposals, the preservation of the whole present system of Customs administration, foreign administration being employed as before ; at the same time, they proposed that gradual methods should be adopted in approaching the tariff question.

It is impossible for the Chinese people to recognise this.

But the Powers were deaf to the truth.

They intimated their respect for Chinese sovereignty, independence, and political integrity. In the same breath they determined the Chinese tariff rates.

Why this contradiction between words and actions?

We have already seen 'Abolition of Likin' and 'Increase of Tariff Rates' become watch-words in the Mackay Treaty. The raising of the tariff rate to 12·5 per cent., and the abolition of likin, are small problems ; but even these were also shifted to the Special Tariff Commission.

We may see how much of China's expectations was realised.

Significance of the Washington Conference.

'Areas of Administration' (concessions, leased lands, etc.), 'Extraterritorial Rights,' and the

system and to bring it into accord with that of Western nations, Great Britain agrees to give every assistance to such reform, and will also be prepared to relinquish her extraterritorial rights when she is satisfied that the state of the Chinese laws, the arrangement for their administration, and other considerations warrant her in so doing."

‘ International Control of Tariffs ’—these are the powerful means by which the Imperialists, strong already in their political ascendancy, may pursue to its end their policy of economic encroachment.

Bargain with them ? Bargain with a tiger for its skin.

China desired the abolition of the Unequal Treaties, for the recovery of national equality and freedom. What were the results ?

The Unequal Treaties remained unaltered. The original rights of the Powers—rights of monopoly, occupation, and economic preference—were hereby formally recognised by this Nine-Power Treaty. China fettered herself ; and the other nine Powers ensured themselves, both singly and collectively.

China was ruinously cheated. Yet there are some people in China who say ‘ China, somehow or other, obtained some advantages, more or less.’

Some time ago, I saw an English cartoon. It depicted a Chinese, whom a foreigner had dragged to the ground by his queue ; the Chinese, meanwhile, squinting at some coins which had fallen from the foreigner’s pocket and putting them in his own.

Ah. That describes China at the Washington Conference. It is pitiable. It is hateful.

2. After the Washington Conference : The Slow Method of Encroachment.

Since the Washington Conference, China, freed from the Japanese policy of independent violent encroachment, has fallen victim to the co-operative

policy of slow encroachment adopted by the Powers.

When any problem has arisen, the Powers have all combined to deal with China.

Take, for example, the Linchen affair of 1923.

The affair was not, in itself, very important. Some brigands carried off about twenty foreigners and over one hundred Chinese. Now, we cannot understand that Chinese life is notably of less value than foreign life. Nor can we grasp the fact that there has never been any brigandage on foreign railways, in foreign countries.

Nevertheless, the Ministers of England, the United States, France, Japan, Italy, and other nations at once despatched very strongly worded inquiries and protests to the Peking Government. Bulletins from the Legation Quarter, discussions in the Chamber of Commerce, notices in the foreign press, all talked of foreign supervision, foreign troop-stations at important junctions, by land and sea, throughout the whole country. They recalled the Boxer War,¹ advocated the despatch of troops by the Powers to China, demanded foreign police control along all the railways, and so on.

Subsequently, the Foreign Diplomatic Corps handed in a formal demand, to the following effect :

- (1) For every man a compensation of \$8,500.
- (2) The organisation of a special police force, under foreign officers, for protection of the railways.

¹ This is always the danger signal. We have seen it raised again, in the autumn of 1926, with as little justification.

(3) The Tuchun of Shantung, Tien Chung-yui, and the officers serving under him, to be deprived of their posts.

When Tsao-Kuan¹ succeeded by bribery in attaining the Presidency, he desired the recognition of the Diplomatic Corps. The Diplomatic Corps exploited the situation so as to extort the concession of the Linchen demands. Tsao-Kuan at once consented, only modifying the second demand slightly.

Such was the collective method of the Powers in dealing with a case of brigandage.

In March of the same year the British, Americans, Japanese and others stationed a fleet in the Yangtse River, and held a naval conference to discuss methods of organising their united fleet, and a special plan for naval police.

In August the Japanese, acting on the advice of the American Naval Command, brought forward a whole series of suggestions ; and the American chief naval officer, representing the Powers, went to Peking to arrange with the Diplomatic Corps. This design

¹ Tsao-Kuan : A notorious militarist in Chinese politics.

He obtained the presidency on October 5, 1924, using a degree of open bribery which has become proverbial.

In one year he spent, in bribes to the Chinese Parliament, \$13,560,000 (one and a half million pounds).

As a result, Sun Yat-sen united with Chang-tso-lin and Lu-Yuan-Hsiang (General of Tuan-Chi-jui) in what is officially known as the Triangular Alliance in the war against Wu Pei-fu, the general of Tsao-Kuan.

During this war Feng Yu-shiang, the Christian general, revolted from Wu Pei-fu and, coming to Peking, imprisoned Tsao-Kuan.

In March of the present year Tuan Chi-jui—the Anfu or pro-Japanese minister—on the defeat of the Kuominchun (National) Forces, under the Christian general, appeased the fast-approaching Wu Pei-fu by the release of Tsao-Kuan, as well as by the slaughter of the unarmed students' patriotic demonstration on March 18.

of blockading China's inland waters had already clearly exposed the significance of the attitude taken by the Powers in the Washington Conference, regarding the withdrawal of foreign military and police.

In the winter of the same year, the Canton Government proposed that the Canton Customs surplus revenue should go to the Canton Government, and not to the Peking Government, which used this very surplus against Canton. This surely was a just request.

The British Minister to Peking, going on the report of the British Consul-General at Canton, requested the British Diplomatic Corps to arrange the mobilization of naval squadrons, representing six Powers, and to the number of twenty ships ; these to be stationed outside Peihutan,¹ threatening the Canton Government.

In the following summer (1924), the Canton Chambers of Merchants prepared a revolt against the Canton Government, and contracted secretly with England regarding the purchase of munitions.

England secretly sent the munitions, which were made free from Customs examination in every port.

When these munitions were transported to the area under control of the Canton Government, that government had them examined. The Chinese Merchants' Party openly protested against their government, relying upon English help. The British Consul-General at Canton thereupon openly sent

¹ A harbour of the Chu River, just outside the city of Canton.

the Canton Government a note amounting to an ultimatum ; announcing that, if the Canton Government attacked the Merchants' Party,¹ the British Navy would turn the guns on them.

These unjust and brutal acts of interference in Chinese home politics nobody dared to resist. We kept silent.

In the winter of 1924 the Chinese people initiated a movement for abolishing the Unequal Treaties. The Peking Diplomatic Corps acted unanimously. They notified the Provisional Executive to the effect that, if it would respect the Unequal Treaties, the Powers would, in return, recognise the Provisional Executive.

Such incidents cannot be counted on the fingers.

The main object throughout is to destroy the lately born Chinese People's Movement, and to arrest the development of the Agricultural and Labour groups, which have demanded emancipation.

Conclusion, with regard to the Fifth Period.

After a careful investigation we must conclude that, from the Washington Conference to the present

¹ This Merchants' Party, otherwise known as the Anti-Sun Party, was run by Chan Lim-pak, the 'compradore' (head business agent) of the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank in Canton.

This person also organized a Merchant Volunteer Force, which aimed at the overthrow of Sun Yat-sen.

Dr. Sun protested to the League of Nations and to Ramsay Macdonald, then Premier and Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Neither message was acknowledged.

Since Mr. Wong wrote this draft, the same policy has been pursued by persons of influence in Hongkong, without hindrance from the Hongkong authorities. For the history of this episode, cf. *Foreign Affairs* for June, July, August, 1926 ; where its connection with the now famous boycott of Hongkong by Canton is indicated.

day,¹ the Powers have pushed their encroachment policy even more strongly than they did between the Boxer War and the Great European War.

They have concentrated their attention on Chinese home politics, with the purpose of preventing a Chinese racial revival.

Unless we can resist them with sufficient power, China cannot continue to exist.

¹ May 1925. There is no modification at the present date (December, 1926).

IV

THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S REVOLUTION AGAINST IMPERIALISM

i. *Sun Yat-sen and the Revolution, 1897-1911.*

At the start of the Opium War, the Chinese people was not united in a clear knowledge of Imperialism, despite its heartfelt enthusiasm and strong determination in resistance to it.

Looking back to that time, we see the Viceroy of Kwangtung and Kwangsi, Ling Tseh-tsu, marching with his army to the strong defence of Humen and the neighbouring region. In the face of this strong preparation of Kwangtung, the British naval and military commanders abandoned their original objective, and despatched forces to attack Amoy and Tinghai, as far as Taku.

The foolish Manchu Government, which had failed to enforce strictly its orders for military preparation satisfied themselves with complaining that their enemies dared not attack Ling Tseh-shin, and with replacing their efficient officers by a swarm of the worthless carrion-flies of the Court: men of the stamp of Chi-Shan.¹ These they sent to face the English.

The result was utter defeat.

¹ A member of the Royal Family. Notoriously weak As a member of the Royal Council he had held his office as a sinecure, in the manner common to the Manchu system.

Thereafter the British threatened to enter Canton City. Their fleet had already forced a way up the Canton River. They demanded power to arrest, as a hostage, the new Viceroy of Kwangtung and Kwangsi, Shu Kwong-chin.

The village volunteer troops, in the vicinity of Canton, gathered thither in bodies, to the number of over one hundred thousand, and posted themselves on both banks of the river. Their courage was high.

The British did not repeat their threat of entering the city. They negotiated for a truce.

If only, at that time, Shu Kwong-chin could have joined with Yeh Min-tan, the governor of Kwangtung, in uniting the people of the two provinces in efficient military preparation, the allied forces of the British and French could hardly have triumphed.

During the Taiping Revolution, Tsêng Kuo-fan, Li Hung-chang and their colleagues asked the English to crush the Taiping-Tien-Kwo. The Taiping-Tien-Kwo chose defeat rather than solicit foreign assistance. This spirit of fortitude is characteristic of the Chinese race.

Finally, after the Sino-French War, Dr. Sun Yat-sen began his People's Revolutionary Movement. And in the next year, that of the Sino-Japanese War, Dr. Sun began to form his first Revolutionary Army in Canton. From that time forward, the Chinese People's Revolutionary Movement had a leader and director.¹

¹ The fascinating story of these early endeavours is partly related in Sir James Cantlie's book on Sun Yat-sen.

Dr. Sun's People's Revolutionary Movement had two aims ; the overthrow, by revolution, of the Manchu Government, with the object of achieving freedom and equality for all races in China ; and the overthrow, by revolution, of Imperialism, with the object of achieving freedom and equality for China among the nations.

His inauguration of the Revolutionary Movement after the Sino-French War, and of his first Revolutionary Army after the Sino-Japanese War, well illustrate his objects.

In the Boxer War, the Boxers in the Northern Provinces, in rage and hatred against the encroachments of the Powers, had risen up to resist. Their motive was just. But the Fist was futile against Machine Guns. And they made the further mistake of inscribing the Manchu Cause on their banners, and so compromising the People's Revolution.

Therefore Dr. Sun Yat-sen started the Second Revolution in Hweichow, to leave no doubt concerning the object of the People's Revolutionary Movement.

After the Second Revolution, the intellectual classes, both in and outside China, together with the various political parties, groups and organisations, gradually joined the People's Revolutionary Movement ; and, by the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War, the People's Revolution had pervaded more than seventeen provinces. From that time the struggle against the Manchu Government continued, culminating, in 1911, in the Revolution.

The Revolutionists, fearing that the Manchu Government, in accordance with their usual practice, would appeal for England's assistance, as they had done in the case of the Taiping Revolutionaries, did not openly declare their aim of abolishing all the Unequal Treaties contracted since the Opium War. They feared that the Powers would assist the Manchu Government.

Nevertheless, Dr. Sun, in his inaugural proclamation, as Provisional President, on January 2, 1912, declared :

'With the establishment of the Provisional Government we shall try our best to carry out the duties of a civilized nation, so as to obtain the rights of a Civilized State.'

His desire for the abolition of such treaties as were not justly binding, was here clearly demonstrated.

2. *Dr. Sun and the Imperialists.*

After the abdication of the Manchu Emperor, and the unification of the Chinese Republic, Dr. Sun devoted himself to the task of combating Imperialism, to complete the work of the People's Revolution.

In a speech delivered at a welcome given him by foreigners in Shanghai, he proposed the return of the concessions.

Soon after he announced his Railway policy.¹

The Imperialists now clearly perceived that his aim had been not only the supersession of the Manchu

¹ Fully worked out in his book on *The International Development of China* (Putnam's, and Shanghai), and referred to in his Will.

Government, but also the pruning away of Imperialist influence in China, in order to establish the Chinese Republic in freedom and equality. They recognised in him an obstacle to their designs, and thereafter set themselves to destroy him.

Scarcely was the Chinese Republic born, when the Consortium of Six Powers was also established. The Six Powers, acting as one, raised their high hand to cut the throat of the new-born child.

In the second year of the Chinese Republic, a loan amounting to £25,000,000 was floated for Yuan Shih-kai to enable him to conduct his counter-revolution.¹

This was the first success for the Imperialists, in their effort to destroy the People's Revolutionary Movement.

After the sixth year of the Chinese Republic [1917] Japan, co-operating with the Peking Government, continued to supply loans and ammunition, in order to enable it to annihilate the Revolutionary Party.

This was the second success of the Imperialists, in their effort to destroy the People's Revolutionary Movement.

After 1923 England initiated, and the other Powers imitated, the practice of sending squadrons of ships to the Canton River, to perform demonstrations of every kind, as a threat to the Canton Government. At the same time England intimated her wishes to the Merchants' Group in Canton, supplying them with munitions and instructing them to revolt against the Canton Government.

¹ See Introduction, page xii. The so-called 'Reorganisation Loan.'

This was the third success of the Imperialists, in their effort to destroy the People's Revolutionary Movement.

But the successes of the Imperialists were not the successes they appeared to be. What was the reason for this?

The leader and director of the People's Revolutionary Movement, Dr. Sun Yat-sen, never, from start to finish, relaxed his struggle against the Imperialists.

During all the years, from 1917, when he was in Canton to organise the Military Government,¹ to 1925, when he died in Peking, never did he borrow a single farthing from the Imperialists. Never did he ask them for the least assistance.

Moreover, in many places, he repeatedly voiced the spirit and motive of the Chinese resistance to Imperialism. Just before his death he was advocating the People's Conference, for the abolition of the Unequal Treaties.² His manifesto was broadcast through China to the eyes and hearts of the people. And on the day before his death he gave instructions to his comrades, proposing the opening of the People's Conference and the abolition of the Unequal Treaties, which should be accomplished in a very short time.

From start to finish, he never relaxed in his battle against the Imperialists.

On their part, the people of all China, at home

¹ See Introduction, p. xvii.

² See the will of Sun Yat-sen, printed at the beginning of this book.

and overseas, joined the People's Revolutionary Movement in greater numbers every day.

After the movement of May the Fourth,¹ the slogans of 'Down with the Militarists,' 'Down with the Imperialists,' were widely adopted in and out of China. Especially the students, agriculturists, and industrial workers took them deeply to heart, knowing that Imperialism and the People's Revolution can never stand together.

From this fact, we can judge whether the successes of Imperialism are final or mark the beginning of defeat.

3. Russia and the Republic.

Whilst the struggle between Imperialism and the People's Revolutionary Movement was becoming acute, there appeared suddenly a most powerful help for China. This was the Russian Revolution.

In former times, no Power had contributed more forcibly than the Russian Empire to the policy of violent encroachment on China.

After the Russo-Japanese War, Russia's advance was slightly checked; but her policy of encroachment remained unaltered. For instance, Russia joined the Consortium of Six Powers, and, as

¹ May the Fourth, 1919, the first of the series of great yearly celebrations of the Chinese Republic.

On this occasion Chinese students burned the house of Tsao Ju-ling, the member of the Anfu (pro-Japanese) Party, who had been directed to negotiate with the Japanese for a loan.

Tsiang Tsun-cheng, who had been Minister to Tokyo, was wounded in Tsao Ju-ling's house. Tsao Ju-ling himself escaped.

already described, entered into all kinds of agreements and secret treaties with Japan.

After the inauguration of the Chinese Republic, Russia employed every possible means to separate Outer Mongolia from the Republic. In Thibet, she rode in the same race as England.

Continued defeat in the Great European War left Russia no spare energy with which to start individual devilment in China. But it was not until 1917 that the Russian Revolution shattered the Tsarist regime, and caused not only the surrender of the old Imperialism abroad, but also the adoption of anti-Imperialistic foreign policy. As soon as the Revolution was secure, the Russians advanced to demanding justice for the races victimized and downtrodden by Imperialism throughout the world, in an effort to strengthen their resistance, deliver them from repression, and restore to them an equal and free status.

These aims Russia has repeatedly expressed with regard to China.

In the summer of 1924 the Sino-Russian Agreement was made, the most weighty parts of which are given herewith :

Article III. The Governments of the two Contracting Parties agree to annul at the Conference as provided in the preceding Article, all Conventions, Treaties, Agreements, Protocols, Contracts, etcetera, concluded between the Government of China and the Tsarist Government, and to replace them with new treaties, agreements, etcetera, on the basis of

equality, reciprocity and justice, as well as the spirit of the Declarations of the Soviet Government of the years of 1919 and 1920.

Article IV. The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in accordance with its policy and Declarations of 1919 and 1920, declares that all Treaties, Agreements, etcetera, concluded between the former Tsarist Government and any third party or parties affecting the sovereign rights or interests of China, are null and void.

The Governments of both Contracting Parties declare that in future neither Government will conclude any treaties or agreements which prejudice the sovereign rights or interests of either Contracting Party.

Article V. The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics recognizes that Outer Mongolia is an integral part of the Republic of China, and respects China's sovereignty therein.

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics declares that, as soon as the questions for the withdrawal of all the troops of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics from Outer Mongolia—namely, as to the time-limit of the withdrawal of such troops and the measures to be adopted in the interests of the safety of the frontiers—are agreed upon at the Conference as provided in Article II. of the present Agreement, it will affect the complete withdrawal of all the troops of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic from all Outer Mongolia.

Article X. The Government of the Union of

Soviet Socialist Republics agrees to renounce the special rights and privileges relating to all Concessions in any part of China acquired by the Tsarist Government under various Conventions, Treaties, Agreements, etcetera.

Article XI. The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics agree to renounce the Russian portion of the Boxer Indemnity.

Article XII. The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics agrees to renounce the rights of extraterritoriality and consular jurisdiction.

Article XIII. The Governments of the two Contracting Parties agree to draw up, simultaneously with the conclusion of a Commercial Treaty at the Conference as provided in Article II, of the present Agreement, a Customs Tariff for the two Contracting Parties in accordance with the principles of equality and reciprocity.

The above Articles detail the vital provisions of the formal Unequal Treaties, which are specifically declared null and void.

In regard to the North Manchurian Railway, and to Mongolia, the same principle is applied methodically, in the same spirit.

The Russian Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics formulated this agreement with China for one only reason. They desired to carry their revolutionary design to a completion both definite and unmistakeable.

Compare this agreement with all our other treaties contracted since the Opium War, and also with the

resolutions adopted at the Washington Conference. We shall then perceive the true natures of Imperialism and of Revolution: the one determined on an uncompromising policy of encroachment in China, the other on the inauguration of a policy towards her based on truth and equality.

Russia's Motives.

Most hideous and repulsive is the talk of easy lips and thin tongues, that 'The energy of the Russians was diminished by the Bolshevik Revolution. Unable to maintain their power in China, they were wiser to give what they could not keep.'

This talk is not easy and shallow, merely. It is the talk of fools.

The national vitality of Soviet Russia is in fact at this moment far greater than that of Old Russia.

But even were it diminished, Russia could at least claim the precedents of 'Equality of Opportunity,' and the rest, and so enjoy her privileges under the Unequal Treaties, equally with the other Powers.

Holland, Spain, Portugal—is their national vitality sufficient to empower them against China? Why do they enjoy privileges under the Unequal Treaties?

Robbers and cutpurses always band together, if they mean to be brigands. (Hence the precedent of 'Equal Opportunity of Privileges' was invented by the Imperialists.)

Did Soviet Russia desire to join the brigand band, she would of course be welcomed by the others.

Because she does not join them, the other Powers hate her to their marrow.

If we say, ‘Soviet Russia was in urgent need of China’s recognition’—probably she had such an idea. But had Russia desired to maintain the privileges of the Unequal Treaties, she had only to join in the brigandage of the Powers. She need have no fear. The older Powers, beleaguered China, would struggle to force upon her the recognition of Russia. Russia would not then have surrendered her special rights and privileges, formerly obtained and exploited by the old Imperialistic Empire.

These easy-lipped talkers, though in their own estimation wise and clever, are fools who swarm with fools.

Some again say simply, ‘This policy of Soviet Russia is a sign of Bolshevism.’

Ah.

If this is the meaning given to Bolshevism, we cannot doubt that, in the eyes of the Powers, the Chinese people’s efforts for the abolition of the Unequal Treaties have been Bolshevism. All the Unequal Treaties, since the Opium War, were not Bolshevism; but the Sino-Russian Agreement, based on mutual respect of sovereign rights and equality of status, is Bolshevism.

Who can doubt, then, that China was properly born by nature a slave to the Imperialists for ever?

As I write, there comes to my mind the statement made by Yuan Shih-kai in the Upper House, during April 1912: ‘Of late the foreigners’ attitude towards

us is, in general, peaceful and just, showing their hearty assistance. This proves the advance of civilization in the world, and makes us appreciate deeply the friendliness of the Foreign Powers. All our people must realise this ; that we may open our hearts for the promotion and fostering of friendly relations. This is the first necessity. All the treaties hitherto agreed upon must be carefully observed. Those agreed to, but not yet enforced, must be enforced with the least possible delay.'

Ah. This is gloriously anti-Bolshevik.

It is the kind of pronouncement practically and truly obeyed hitherto by the Peking Government.

Gladly may the Imperialists chorus, loudly as ever, ' Long Life to the Unequal Treaties ! '

But the Chinese people does not fear the threat of Bolshevism. Only, it cannot rub its eyes and see clearly who are the supporters of the Unequal Treaties and who would destroy it. Dr. Sun's will says, ' Awaken the masses ; unite with the other nations in the world who have treated us as equals, to strive together in the common battle'.

Along this road alone can the People's Revolution march to success.

4. '*Down with Imperialism.*'

Of the two slogans, ' Down with Imperialism ' and ' Down with Militarism,' the cry ' Down with Imperialism ' is the more vital. It is the root of roots.

Recent events have already proved that Militarism is no more than the marionette of Imperialism.

The shattering of Militarism is only the splintering of a marionette. Another is ready behind the scenes.

But when Imperialism is shattered, Militarism is doomed.

Therefore, for the People's Revolution, the will to crush Imperialism is the root of roots.

The greatest task to accomplish for the shattering of Imperialism, is to abolish the Unequal Treaties.

Some say, 'The national vitality of China could not suffice to crush the Imperialism of one single Power. The attempt to crush the Imperialism of all the Powers would be just the Boxer Rising over again.'

Formally and sincerely we reply that the Boxer Rising was anti-foreign ; whereas the People's Revolution is antagonistic not to the foreigners but only to Imperialism.

But if the Powers can, of their own accord, make an end of Imperialism, they are our intimate and respected friends, with whom we shall fairly co-operate.

Do you call this anti-foreignism ?

At this time, although the national governments are Imperialistic, the peoples are not all Imperialists.

The poison of Imperialism is received directly by the Chinese people, and indirectly accepted by the peoples of the other nations.¹ This we can see clearly from the economic situation.

¹ Cf. Chapter I. of this Draft.

The people, in every country, has the idea of crushing Imperialism, but less strongly than the Chinese. Could the Chinese people co-operate with them in this work, they would welcome it gladly. For the destruction of Imperialism would benefit not only the Chinese people, but equally the peoples of all the world.

The Chinese People's Revolution is aimed only at the Imperialistic Governments of the Powers. To unite, in their overthrow, the strength of the Chinese people with the strength of the peoples of all the world, is not impossible.

Others say, 'China's Foreign Problem, from first to last, can be solved only according to the sufficiency of our internal power. China's present need is this. We must reform our Finance, Industrial Enterprise, Political Development, Promotion of Education, and so forth. If, instead of starting from these urgent problems, we insist on the solution of our foreign problems, we are putting last things first.'

We answer again that the destruction of Militarism and of Imperialism is the first necessity for the People's Revolution.

Triumph over Imperialism is the root of roots.

If further proof is needed, let us give one more clear illustration in the matter of Financial Reform.

Reform of the Financial System is a necessary step toward adequately increasing our internal power. But, because our Militarists indulge in war and gain pleasure from fighting, in addition to seizure

of lands, acceptance of bribes, violation of law, and their other customary satisfactions, the condition of Government Finance daily deteriorates.

How is Financial Reform possible ?

Therefore, we must contrive to crush the Militarists before we can reorganize our Finance.

But the Militarists and the Imperialists are in alliance, defying the hatred of the people of the whole country. And, while the people is desperately struggling against the Militarists, the Imperialists advance them huge loans, so that, despite the opposition of the people, they can recruit more soldiers, buy more cavalry, and spend money like water as before.

Relying on the power of the Imperialists, they oppress the whole people, that endeavours in vain to resist them ; that can only hold its breath, swallow its wrath, and submit to them and their tyranny.

Therefore, the Militarists become daily more wild : daily they increase the financial disorders.¹

How can we strengthen the country's internal power ?

No. We must crush the Militarists. And first we must crush the Imperialists.

It is not we who are ' putting last things first.'

With regard to industrial development, political improvement, promotion of education, and the rest, we can deduce our argument in the same way.

¹ As I correct the proof, the struggle for liberty is at hand. If the patriots should suffer defeat, or partial defeat, the certain issue will be deferred. It is not in doubt. (J. N. S.)

There is an old maxim : ‘ Top and bottom, beginning and end, these are common to all things. To set these in their place with understanding, is to approach Truth.’

Well. Shall we set the Foreign Problem at the beginning or the end ?

Others, again, say ‘ The Powers have never finally refused to abolish the Unequal Treaties. But China needs proper preparation. For example, in the matter of extraterritorial rights ; must not the Powers, before abolishing them, wait for China to reform her methods of jurisdiction and to train legal experts ? China does not strive to make the proper preparation, but just shouts for the abolition of the Unequal Treaties. This is not only unsatisfactory to the other peoples, but wholly futile.’

We answer that such persons are fooled by the Imperialists. Let us discuss extraterritorial rights.

It is true that China needs legal reform, and the training of legal experts. But these can follow only on an improvement of the political situation. While the Imperialists are playing the Militarists, how can the political situation be improved ?

Moreover, the demanded reforms, and the training of legal experts, would bring changes in degree, but not in kind.

If the Imperialists are really desirous of relinquishing extraterritorial rights, they need not be over-timid. Soviet Russia has already abandoned them ; Germany and Austria, after their defeat in

the Great War, possess them no longer.¹ Russians, Germans and Austrians have not, as a consequence, lost their safety or security in China.

If, on the other hand, the Imperialists are not really desirous of relinquishing extraterritorial rights, perfect reform of China's legal system, and perfect training of legal experts, would make no difference. The Powers are bound to produce another pretext for refusing to relinquish extraterritorial rights.

Therefore, we believe that the abolition of extra-territorial rights depends not so much on the reform of our jurisdiction, and the training of our legal experts, as on the increased energy of the People's Revolution ; just as it was Turkey's ability to defeat the Greeks that enabled the Angora Government of Turkey to make their country independent and free, and to decide, at the Lausanne Conference, on a definite date for the abolition of extraterritorial rights. This was achieved through the exertions of the People's Party and the People's Army in Turkey.

We should regard these facts, and not be easily fooled when the Imperialists talk of 'suitable preparation' and all the rest of it.

There are yet others, who say 'According to the principles of International Law, treaties are formed by the agreement of both parties and cannot be abolished by the wish of one party.'

We answer that these words are very misleading, and especially so in the case of China.

¹ Hence their commercial progress in China, at the cost of the "Favoured Nations."

From the Opium War up to the present time, the Unequal Treaties contracted were all extorted by the Imperialists by means of threats, force, blackmail, and other such means.

The Chinese people never has consented.

The Nanking Treaty was the result of the Opium War.

The Tientsin and Peking Treaties were extorted by the united force of the English and the French.

The Makwan Treaty was the result of the Sino-Japanese War.

The Boxer Treaty was extorted by the united forces of eight Powers.

All these were violent robberies, without the consent of the Chinese people.

Again, in 1898 and after, all kinds of treaties, concerning leases and determinations of 'Spheres of Influence,' culminating in the Twenty-one Demands of May 1915, were signed under the threat of violence, and without the consent of the Chinese people.

Again, documents were exchanged concerning the two railways, Tsi-suen and Kao-su, and concerning the four railways in Manchuria and Mongolia. The Chinese Minister 'had heartily agreed.' But, in reality, a type of blackmail had been used, by the exploitation of China's callow government. Robbery with violence.

The Chinese people had never dreamed of such an arrangement. How could it agree?

The Manchu Government fawned on the

foreigners for their private advantage. The Chinese people could not bear this : therefore the people rose for revolution. The treaties signed by the Manchu Government cannot be accepted by the Chinese people. This is clear.

After the Revolution, the Peking Government contracted treaties, during the time when it was violating the constitution, and had lost, therefore, its constitutional status.

The Chinese people had already made the Revolution, proclaiming it impossible to recognise the treaties contracted by the Peking Government.

It is needless to state that such treaties could not gain the consent of the people.

We may see, from all these facts, that the so-called 'agreement of both parties' is a deceitful phrase.

Lastly, what is International Law ?

It is an instrument for securing the privileges obtained from the weak by the powerful nations.

The powerful nation has already used force or blackmail to obtain the privileges from the weak nation ; it further uses international law to secure the privileges obtained. A wolf and a lamb talking justice.

Look at the greed of Imperialists to-day.

Obtain their consent to abolish the Unequal Treaties ? Wait for the river to lose its mud.

The life of the people is too short.

... Look. What is this picture ? It is the Japanese Plenipotentiary, at the table of the Chief

Committee on Far Eastern Affairs at the Washington Conference, making his speech concerning the Twenty-one Demands ; a speech which answers definitely and clearly the demand for the abolition of the Unequal Treaties.

V

RESOLUTIONS CONCERNING INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS DRAFTED FOR THE PEOPLE'S CONFERENCE

Taking our stand upon the facts and arguments here produced, we are ready to propose to the People's Conference the following Resolutions in regard to China's International Problems.

We start with the principle that all the Unequal Treaties, dating from the Opium War up to the present time, must be unreservedly abolished. Their place must be taken by treaties founded upon the equality of the contracting parties, with full respect for the sovereign rights of all.

In agreement with this principle, we present the detailed articles :

First. China must resume possession of all the territories she has lost.

Second. Those states which were formerly vassal states of China, such as Chosen¹ and Annam, must be restored to their original national status, independence, and equality.

The question of their federation with China, they shall be free to decide.

¹ The ancient name for Korea.

Third. You must regain all the concessions.

Fourth. You must regain all the leased territories.

Fifth. You must regain control of all the railways now controlled by foreigners, and of all the Chinese territory in their vicinity.

Sixth. You must abolish the present arrangements concerning the Legation Quarter in Peking.

The military armaments,¹ together with the troops and police, of the Foreign Powers, must be withdrawn.

Seventh. You must abolish all spheres of influence.

Eighth. You must no longer consent to the stationing of foreign military and police in Chinese territory.

Ninth. You must withdraw from foreign boats and vessels the right of navigation in China's Inland Waters.

Tenth. You must abolish extraterritorial rights.

Eleventh. You must regain tariff autonomy.

All the International Control of tariff rates, and all the foreign inspectors, must go. An end must be put, once for all, to the evil system by which, since the foundation of the Republic, the Customs revenues have been handed to the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, and deposited under the name of the Inspector General of Customs, for him to allocate to various uses month by month.

These eleven items concern China's Integrity of

¹ Especially the Seven Forts of the foreigners in Peking are meant.

Territory and Independent Sovereign Rights, and are vital.

Your other resolutions will be derived from these.

Besides all this, we must review our foreign debts ; discriminate between those which justly demand payment and those which do not, and determine by what means payment can be made.

Finally, we should announce that never again may the Powers, in dealing with China, insult her by the use of such phrases as 'The Integrity of Territory,' 'The Open Door Policy,' 'Equal Opportunity of Privileges,' and the rest.

When these resolutions are proclaimed, let us shout aloud :

- ' Away with the Unequal Treaties.'
- ' Destruction to Imperialism.'
- ' Success to the Chinese People's Revolution.'
- ' Long live the Independence, Equality, and Freedom of the Chinese Republic.'

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Note.—The works enumerated in this short Bibliography are all recognised as of the highest authority. Those in Section 1 are suitable for either the interested general reader or the serious student of history. Those in Section 2 are the standard books of reference in English for the modern international history of China.

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
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BASED ON THAT PREPARED BY DOCTOR SUN YAT-SEN.

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